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Introduction
Against a background of growing international competition and of pervasive uncertainty and 
ﬂ  uidity, ﬂ  exicurity policies are being actively promoted in the EU policy agenda as a useful policy tool 
to address the needs of business to respond to rapid changes, while providing workers with a safety 
net. On one hand, businesses need to be able to adjust to new challenges and improve their competi-
tiveness. On the other, the European social model needs to be reinforced and provide workers with 
protection, but also opportunities, in a volatile and threatening environment. The ﬂ  exicurity model 
seems to provide the link between these seemingly incompatible goals.
However, some critical questions arise as to the universal relevance of this model:  
Is the ﬂ  exicurity model the only way forward to achieve ecoomic efﬁ  ciency for business and  a) 
adequate protection or workers? What is the cost of not introducing ﬂ  exicurity measures in 
an economy that struggles to remain competitive? 
Can ﬂ  exicurity policies (however broad their scope) be adjusted to ﬁ  t in with the idiosyn- b) 
crasies of widely varied national and institutional backgrounds, whilst retaining their main 
characteristics? 
 Does the ﬂ  exicurity trade-off by deﬁ  nition always lead to a “win-win situation” for all the  c) 
actors involved, regardless of the national context?
The aim of this work is to address the above questions, as well as to shed some light on four 
particular aspects of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda and the concurrent debate:
The ﬂ  exicurity policy agenda is based on an asymmetrical relationship, as it involves a trade- i) 
off between unequal partners, with winners and losers both across, as well as within the ranks 
of the social actors;
The ﬂ  exicurity model is not a “one-size-ﬁ  ts-all” model, as there exist huge national differ- ii) 
ences that need to be taken into consideration in the process of policy implementation;
The importance of institutional and cultural factors (for example, the institutional back- iii) 
ground, the consensus culture, the level of trust, indiidual and collective expectations from  Page ● 6
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the future) in the implementation of ﬂ  exicurity policies are often over-shadowed by econom-
ic and political considerations; 
 Alternative policy agendas need to be established that are more tailored to the needs and the  iv) 
idiosyncrasies of particular national contexts.
Special attention in this paper is devoted to the question whether ﬂ  exicurity policies can be suc-
cessfully promoted in a national context characterised by segmented labour markets and widespread 
atypical and often unregulated employment, sub-protective welfare systems, a weak social consulta-
tion tradition, and the defensive responses of business to the challenges of globalisation. To this end, 
a considerable part of the work compares the experience of adopting ﬂ  exibility and security meas-
ures in 4 EU countries (chosen on the basis of their distinct employment and welfare regimes and 
their vastly different degree of endorsement of ﬂ  exicurity policies in their national policy agendas): 2 
success stories – Denmark and the Netherlands- on one hand, and 2 reluctant supporters- Spain and 
Greece- on the other. The purpose of this comparative approach is to highlight the importance of 
institutional factors, as well as the (often under-estimated) key role of social attitudes and norms, in 
determining the direction and outcome of particular welfare and labour market initiatives.
The ﬁ  rst 5 sections of this work provide an overview of the main components of the ﬂ  exicurity 
policy agenda, as spelled out in detail by the EU documents and as implemented on the terrain in the 
two success stories, Denmark and the Netherlands. Sections 6, 7 and 8 attempt a comparative analysis 
of the impact of the national context (economic, social, institutional and cultural) on the outcome 
of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda in the 4 countries under consideration. Finally, section 9 discusses the main 
ﬁ  ndings of the report and questions the relevance of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda in times of growing un-
certainty and global economic crisis.Page ● 7
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Deﬁ  nition of concepts and typology  1. 
of ﬂ  exicurity
  What does “ﬂ  exicurity” mean and what it does not  1.1. 
mean 
The EU inspired neologism ﬂ  exicurity   -like the ﬁ  rst of its two composing terms, ﬂ  exibility- is 
vague enough to encompass a number of different versions. This is the reason why it is quite often 
mistakenly regarded as a euphemism for pure and simple greater labour market deregulation. Howev-
er, labour market ﬂ  exibility and ﬂ  exicurity policies should not be confused and used interchangeably. 
The main difference between “ﬂ  exibility” and “ﬂ  exicurity” policies lies in the role of policy interven-
tions to ensure that –in the pursuit of greater labour market ﬂ  exibility- the needs and concerns of the 
workforce will also be taken into account. 
Depending on the perspective, the content of ﬂ  exicurity is perceived quite differently. From 
the business perspective, ﬂ  exicurity means a greater degree of ﬂ  exibility, especially with regards to 4 
major ﬁ  elds: 
 hiring and ﬁ  ring procedures: this implies a relaxation of the employment protection legisla- a) 
tion, in order to reduce the cost of ﬁ  ring, whilst lifting the barriers to lay-offs;
adjusting the number of workers and of hours worked to the ﬂ  uctuations of demand: this  b) 
implies wider use of ﬁ  xed-term contracts, of temporary agency workers and of outsourc-
ing. It also means the possibility to vary the working hours of the stable workforce, through 
ﬂ  exible working arrangements, part-time work, annualisation of working hours, etc;
 improving the use of human capital within the ﬁ  rm: this can be achieved by enhancing multi- c) 
 skilling, team working, job rotation and the redeployment of the workforce; and
greater wage ﬂ  exibility, i.e. performance-related pay, free wage ﬂ  uctuation according to re- d) 
sults, opting out of collective agreements, etc. Page ● 10
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By contrast, from the labour perspective, ﬂ  exicurity means mostly 3 things:
job protection, or, at worst employment and income protection, in order to reduce the social  a) 
risks and the uncertainties associated with economic restructuring and deregulation;
incentives to allow for smooth transitions between working and non-working life: e.g. parental  b) 
leave, shorter working hours, predictability of employment status, care facilities, etc.; and 
long-term leave for learning or personal reasons. c) 
Striking a balance between these very different views of ﬂ  exicurity is one of the main challenges 
of the ﬂ  exicurity policy agenda, especially in a context of economic downturn and international 
volatility. As it is the government and companies who essentially determine the extent and form of 
ﬂ  exicurity that is applied in practice, it is most important that the weaker partner in this deal –labour- 
can voice its concerns and protect its interests. 
1.2.  Types and possible combinations of ﬂ  exibility and 
security    
The concepts of ﬂ  exibility, on one hand, and security, on the other cover a broad range of work 
organization practices, working patterns, employment contracts, labour market systems and welfare 
regimes. With respect to ﬂ exibility, there seems to be a broad consensus in the literature that there exist 
4 different types that approximate Atkinson’s ﬂ exible ﬁ  rm model, which typically distinguishes between 
the 4 following forms: (a) numerical ﬂ  exibility; (b) working time ﬂ  exibility; (c) functional ﬂ  exibility, 
and (d) wage ﬂ  exibility. 1 Another, more recent, conﬁ  guration of the various forms of ﬂ  exibility is 
the subdivision suggested by Gouldswaard & de Nanteuil, who differentiate between external and 
internal ﬂ  exibility on one hand, and quantitative and qualitative ﬂ  exibility, on the other. 2  These sub-
divisions correspond to the following four types of ﬂ  exibility that largely overlap with Atkinson’s: (a) 
numerical/ contractual ﬂ  exibility; (b) productive/ geographical ﬂ  exibility; (c) functional/ organiza-
tional ﬂ  exibility and (d) temporal/ ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility. 3
1  See Madsen, 2006
2  See Eurofound, 2007
3   ibid. Page ● 11
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Thus, depending on the institutional context and their business strategy, ﬂ  exibility allows com-
panies and organizations to vary the quantity of their workforce and of the total hours worked, to 
choose between a variety of employment contracts, to determine the take-home pay of their em-
ployees, and to affect the overall level of security and protection these are entitled to. On the other 
hand, workers, depending on their bargaining position and their labour market status, enjoy a varied 
degree of employment and social security rights (job security, access to training, job search assistance, 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts, social beneﬁ  ts, work-life balance, pension rights, etc.), ranging from a high 
level for the core workforce to none at all for the marginal or casual workers. Security, thus, assumes 
a different connotation and content for the different segments of the workforce, but also for the 
individual worker during his/her lifetime course. At the aggregate level, security can take 4 different 
forms: job security, employment security; income security; and combination security. The ﬁ  rst three 
types of security are associated with a different degree of vulnerability, whilst the fourth, with work-
life balance (see Diagram 1 for a detailed representation). Page ● 12
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Diagram 1: Types of ﬂ  exibility and security
TYPES OF FLEXIBILITY TYPES OF SECURITY
external numerical 
ﬂ  exibility:
possibility to vary the 
amount of  labour in 
response to even short-term 
changes in demand











expectation of  a high 
job tenure with the same 
employer
(objective and subjective 
job insecurity)
indeﬁ  nite duration  • 
contracts (workers 
in public sector or 
large companies)
high EPL index • 
reduced working  • 
hours
early retirement • 
internal numerical 
ﬂ  exibility:
possibility to change the 
number of  hours worked 
and to determine the 
working time schedules
part-time work • 
overtime work • 
night and shift  • 
work
weekend working • 
compressed  • 
working week
employment security:
degree of  certainty to get 
a new job if  loosing the 






active labour  • 
market policies
education, training,  • 
LLL
functional ﬂ  exibility:
possibility to quickly 
redeploy employees to other 
tasks and activities
task rotation • 
multitasking • 
job enrichment • 
ﬂ  exible organisation  • 
of work
training • 
team autonomy • 
income security:
protection of  income in case 
of  sickness, unemployment 
or maternity
(vulnerability)
UB, social beneﬁ  ts • 
minimum wage • 
supplementary  • 
beneﬁ  t for working 
fewer hours
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  exibility:
possibility to alter 
standardised pay structures
wage ﬂ  exibility • 
performance  • 
related pay
local adjustments in  • 
labour costs
reductions in SS  • 
payments
bonus, fringe  • 
beneﬁ  ts
combination security:
possibility to combine paid 
work with private life and 
social responsibilities
different types of  • 
leave schemes
voluntary working  • 
time arrangements
early retirement • 
Source: Eurofound, 2008a, “Employment security and employability: a contribution to the ﬂ exicurity debate”
The above scheme is far from being ﬂ  awless and unproblematic, as it assumes that the vast variety 
of business strategies and of labour market situations encountered in real life can actually fall into 16 
well deﬁ  ned boxes of “ideal types” of ﬂ  exibility and security.
In their widely known work, Wilthagen and Tros (2004) take this scheme a step forward and 
establish a matrix identifying the possible combinations between the four types of ﬂ  exibility and the 
four types of security to produce a set of possible ﬂ  exicurity policy mixes (see Diagram 2). Page ● 13
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   shorter working
   week
- voluntary 
   working time 
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However, as the above matrix illustrates, in practice, one combination is not possible – that of 
external numerical ﬂ  exibility and job security- whilst another two are to a greater or lesser degree 
mutually exclusive: external numerical ﬂ  exibility is quite incompatible with work-life balance (com-
bination security), whilst the same is true, though to a smaller degree, regarding internal numerical 
/working time ﬂ  exibility. Employees with family responsibilities need to have predictable (and not 
long) working hours’ schedules and job stability. All other combinations are possible. Depending on 
the particular national labour market regime, the emphasis on either the ﬂ  exibility or security compo-
nent will vary, producing a different outcome.
The Wilthagen & Tros typology presented above has aroused some controversy as regards its 
interpretation as a list of different trade-offs between forms of ﬂ  exibility and security. Leschke et al. 
(2006) from the transitional labour markets school focus their critique on the limitations of this matrix to 
4  Wilthagen, mentioned in Eurofound, 2008a Page ● 14
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assess both the ﬂ  exibility and the security dimension of labour market reforms. 5 They point out that 
this matrix is static and simplistic, as it does not represent the possible interrelationships between the 
different types of ﬂ  exibility and security: the ﬂ  exibility gains of employers do not necessarily entail 
a loss of security amongst the employees; similarly, security gains of employees do not necessarily 
mean a loss of ﬂ  exibility for employers (as is the case of job security which enhances loyalty to the 
company and internal functional ﬂ  exibility). Other combinations, however, can be “lethal”, as for 
example, when the relaxation of hiring and ﬁ  ring regulations can lead to an overall insecurity that 
has negative consequences on aggregate demand and even fertility. Hence, whether the outcome of 
the possible combinations between ﬂ  exibility and security will be a trade-off, a mutually beneﬁ  cial 
arrangement or a “vicious relationship” as they call it, will depend on the prevailing particular labour 
market and individual circumstances. To their view, the transitional labour markets framework pro-
vides a more dynamic insight to assess the impact of reforms, in terms of efﬁ  cient and equitable 
ﬂ  exicurity criteria.
To reinforce the arguments put forward by the above critique, one could add that it is not at all 
obvious whether, under any circumstances, ﬂ  exibility is always harmful for the employees and that se-
curity always constitutes an unbearable cost for employers. It may well be the case that a higher degree 
of ﬂ  exibility can enhance labour productivity and ﬁ  rm competitiveness and thus save jobs that would 
otherwise have to be shed. Or, inversely, that –in a context of intensiﬁ  ed international competition- 
the ultimate outcome of less ﬂ  exibility is less security for the workforce. 6 Additionally, it is often the 
case that in times of uncertainty, a secure workforce can feel more committed to its job and highly 
skilled employees might be less tempted to venture for another job. To this end, one might consider a 
5  For consistency purposes, the authors suggest two modiﬁ  cations in the terminology used in the Wilthagen 
& Tros matrix: (a) wage ﬂ  exibility is re-named as ‘external numerical ﬂ  exibility’, which is achieved through 
wage ﬂ  exibility, out-sourcing and high quality temporary agency work; (b) combination security is coined 
as ‘option security’, in order to give it a broader meaning that includes civic engagement and further educa-
tion.
6  For example, a high degree of employment protection or the prevalence of rigid patterns of work organisation can 
drive a ﬁ  rm out of business and its workforce to the dole. Alternatively, it can drive a ﬁ  rm to outsource part of its 
activities and/or have a greater recourse to unstable and precarious workers in order to circumvent restrictions, thus 
deepening labour market segmentation. Page ● 15
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somewhat differentiated conﬁ  guration of the possible combinations between ﬂ  exibility and security 
that takes into account these different possibilities:
A  a)  low degree of ﬂ  exibility is associated with a high degree of employee security for the core 
workforce, but less security for the peripheral workforce (this is the case of well protected or 
rigid labour markets);
a high degree of ﬂ  exibility is associated with a low degree of security for both the core and  b) 
the peripheral workforce (this is the case of deregulated labour markets);
a high c)   degree of ﬂ  exibility could be associated with a higher degree of security, either at the 
macro-level through the creation of new jobs, or at the micro-level through the cautious 
exchange of rights between the more protected segments of the workforce and the weaker 
groups (this is the case of a win-win situation, or a “virtuous circle”).Page ● 16
Aliki MourikiPage ● 17
Flexibility and security: an asymmetrical relationship?
2.  Implications of various forms of 
ﬂ  exicurity combinations
2.1.   Implications for workers
The impact of ﬂ  exicurity policies on labour ultimately depends on how effective these policies 
are in addressing not only the problem of unemployment but also of quality of life and social cohe-
sion. When the security dimension of the ﬂ  exicurity strategies is sacriﬁ  ced in favour of the ﬂ exibility 
dimension, as is often the case when labour’s negotiating power is weak, problems of vulnerability 
and social exclusion are bound to emerge.
Some groups of workers, in particular, are more vulnerable than others when exposed to high 
levels of ﬂ  exibility that is not traded-off against some sort of security. Temporary workers (and all 
the variants of short-term workers), are considered as the most vulnerable segment of the workforce 
as, with few exceptions, they are usually trapped in low quality and insecure jobs and, most common-
ly, they have limited or no access to training, few if any employment and social security rights, and 
uncertainty regarding their future job prospects as well as difﬁ  culties in reconciling work and family 
life. Part-time workers, especially in the case of involuntary part-time work, also face serious discrimi-
nations compared to full time workers, in terms of access to training schemes, career prospects and 
professional status, but they are in a better position to combine work with family life due to their 
reduced working hours. Other vulnerable categories of ﬂ  exible or atypical workers that beneﬁ  t the 
least from ﬂ  exicurity policies include the low educated workers, workers with irregular contracts, self-
employed workers without employees, pseudo-independent (bogus) self-employed workers, workers 
in small ﬁ  rms, freelance workers, etc.
The household composition also plays a role in the employment patterns of the family members 
and, hence, in their degree of vulnerability. According to a Eurofound analysis of in-work poverty, 
there is a clear association between household composition, non-permanent contracts or interrupted 
career paths and greater vulnerability of workers, reﬂ  ecting the growing incidence of the working Page ● 18
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poor in recent years, in most European countries (see Pena-Casa and Latta, 2004, in Eurofound, 
2007). 
The widespread use of certain forms of ﬂ  exibility is often the result of labour market rigidities. 
When employment protection is strong for the permanent workers, companies and organizations 
are motivated and inclined to have greater recourse to atypical workers, in view of increasing their 
numerical and wage ﬂ  exibility.7 The core workforce thus retains its high degree of protection and 
employment and social security rights, to the detriment of the weaker segments of the workforce that 
are usually deprived of both. As a result, ﬂ  exibility is concentrated at the margins of the workforce, 
thus reinforcing the divide between a privileged core of permanent employees with full employment 
and social security rights and an underclass of marginalized, casual workers with few if any basic 
rights and career prospects, often trapped into poverty. This is particularly the case of dualist labour 
markets with a strong “insiders-outsiders” effect. 
Finally, one must also bear in mind that even the protected section of the “core” workforce is 
not immune from the precariousness of the working conditions of “peripheral” workers; contingent 
work and involuntary turnover of the permanent workforce are positively and signiﬁ  cantly corre-
lated. On the other hand, empirical evidence from the U.K. indicates that part-time workers, contrary 
to popular notions, do not experience more job insecurity than full-time workers, which suggests 
that one cannot readily lump them together with temporary workers as contingent, precarious and 
numerically ﬂ  exible labour (European Commission-EU research, 2005). It appears that the security 
dimension is increasingly becoming the new dividing line between “good” jobs and “bad” jobs. An 
example of this new division is that a low-skilled and poorly remunerated job in a protected segment 
of the labour market is more secure, and hence more appreciated, than a well-paid highly skilled job 
in a volatile sector of activity. 
2.2.   Implications for companies and organisations
Greater ﬂ  exibility is not always translated into enhanced economic efﬁ  ciency for companies and 
organizations. Often, a high degree of ﬂ  exibility, especially in the form of lower employment protec-
7  A typical example of this is the recruitment of temporary and part-time personnel in the public sector, to offset the 
rigidities associated with the employment status of the tenured personnel.Page ● 19
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tion, extensive use of precarious workers or outsourcing, result into a lower investment of the com-
pany in human capital and, hence, in lower productivity. Workers that are under-paid have reduced 
motivation and attachment to their workplace. Increased labour mobility also weakens loyalty to the 
company/organization. By contrast, job stability, access to training, job enrichment, career opportu-
nities and work-life balance improve the commitment of the workforce and its performance, to the 
beneﬁ  t of the employer.
Diagram 3: Implications of various forms of ﬂ  exibility for companies and workers
form of ﬂ  exibility implications for companies implications for workers
temporary (ﬁ  xed-term) 
employment contracts
higher quality matches,  • 
higher efﬁ  ciency
lower incentive to invest in  • 
human capital, decreasing 
productivity
opportunity to assess the  • 
potential of new recruits 
without risking dismissal 
costs
job instability leading to job  • 
insecurity
shorter duration of  • 
unemployment
“port of entry” or trap to  • 
precarious employment?
vulnerability to new social  • 
risks
few (if any) training  • 
opportunities, as well as 
employment and SS rights
low job satisfaction • 
lower work attachment • 
less combination security  • 
involuntary part-time work
voluntary part-time work
higher numerical ﬂ  exibility • 
more committed employees • 
as above
possibility to combine work  • 
and family responsibilities
low EPL-index easy ﬁ  ring & hiring  • 
procedures to adjust the 
number of workers to 
demand ﬂ  uctuations
disincentive to invest in  • 
innovation and functional 
ﬂ  exibility, as a response to 
competitive pressures
job insecurity • 
income instability • 
uncertainty for the future • 
working time ﬂ  exibility 
determined by employers
(company oriented)
better response to  • 
ﬂ  uctuations of demand
better use of equipment and  • 
human capital 
difﬁ  culties in achieving a  • 
work-life balance
possibility to adjust start and  • 
ﬁ  nishing times
individualized working time 
arrangements (employee 
oriented)
mutual beneﬁ  ts for  • 
companies and workers
greater working time  • 
autonomy
possibility to accumulate  • 
hours for shorter or longer 
periods of leave
functional ﬂ  exibility improved performance of  • 
the workforce
access to training,  • 
continuous updating of skills
increased employability • 
job satisfaction • 
wage ﬂ  exibility rationalization of wage costs •  increased income for some,  • 
decreased earnings for othersPage ● 20
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2.3.  Implications for welfare regimes
Traditional social protection systems build around the male breadwinner model of full time, 
uninterrupted employment until retirement are no longer relevant for increasing segments of the 
workforce. As many scholars observe, the “standard employment contract” can no longer remain a 
reference point for the European welfare states. 8
As labour markets become more ﬂ  exible, the social protection systems need to adjust rapidly to 
the new socio-economic realities and provide support for safe transitions between employment and 
non-employment. If people have conﬁ  dence that the welfare institutions will ensure them income 
security, they might be more willing to take risks in their working lives and accept temporary changes 
in their employment status. Social protection systems need also to provide a safety net for the more 
vulnerable segments of the workforce, especially the long-term unemployed and the growing number 
of the working poor.
 Certain forms of ﬂ  exicurity arrangements have a negative impact on social rights, the level of 
income and, ultimately, the ﬁ  nancial sustainability of the social security systems. Casual or discontinu-
ous employment patterns in particular (especially on-call work, very short hours’ work, involuntary 
part-time work and protracted ﬁ  xed-term contracts) are closely linked to in-work poverty. Whilst 
the expansion of new forms of self-employment and the transition from employee status to self-
employment, as Visser (2005) has pointed out, may produce a ‘regulation gap’ with regard to pensions 
and social security coverage, with exclusionary consequences due to under-insurance in the future. 
The continuous growth of unstable incomes and low pay, but also of the non-employed active 
population, not only increase social inequalities and threaten social cohesion, but they also erode 
the long-term viability of social protection systems, already burdened by demographic ageing and 
budgetary constraints. As the link between paid employment and social rights is becoming weaker, 
the capability of social protection systems to compensate for the totality of employment and social 
security rights that were formerly ensured through participation in employment is also diminishing 
(Auer, 2008). 9
8  See, amongst others, Viebrock & Clasen, 2009
9  Deeply concerned by these developments, some scholars and policy makers go as far as suggesting a radical de-linking 
between employment relationships and social rights. See for example Supiot’s proposal for social drawing rights men-
tioned in Auer, 2008. Page ● 21
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3.  The rationale behind ﬂ  exicurity 
policies
3.1.  The challenges of globalisation and the Lisbon strategy
Eager to address the challenges of increasing international competition, economic volatility and 
technological change, the European Commission has been investigating over the past 20 years for 
the appropriate policies and tools that would at the same time produce growth and jobs, whilst 
safeguarding the European social model. Within this context, the elaboration of policies that – un-
like the American ﬂ  exible labour market approach- would balance the ﬂ  exibility needs of business 
with the security needs of the employees has been at the centre of policy debate in the EU since the 
mid-1990s. In 1996, the Green Paper on partnership for a new organization of  work for the ﬁ  rst time made a 
mention to the need of pursuing ﬂ  exicurity policies in order to address the uncertainties inherent in 
the reorganization of work. Ten years later, in 2006, the Commission issued a Green Paper on the mod-
ernization of  Labour Law where it speciﬁ  cally addressed issues related to different kinds of contracts 
and the ﬂ  exicurity challenge (Eurofound, 2007). 
In June 2007 the Commission adopted a Communication “Towards Common Principles of Flex-
icurity: More and better jobs through ﬂ  exibility and security”, proposing the establishment of com-
mon principles of ﬂ  exicurity to promote more and
better jobs – in line with the Lisbon objectives- by combining ﬂ  exibility and security for workers 
and companies. These common principles, elaborated in close cooperation with the social partners’ 
organisations, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, were adopted by the European Council in December 2007. 
Over the years, the ﬂ  exicurity strategy became an important policy component of the European 
Employment Strategy, the Social Agenda and the Lisbon agenda. Guideline 21 of the Integrated 
Guidelines for Growth and Jobs stresses the need to promote ﬂ  exibility combined with employment 
security and reduce labour market segmentation, having due regard to the role of the Social Partners. 
Other guidelines, in particular Guideline 18 on modern social protection systems, Guideline 19 on Page ● 22
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Active Labour Market Policies, and Guideline 23 on Life Long Learning strategies also refer to the 
ﬂ  exicurity components as deﬁ  ned by the European Commission and the Council.
Flexicurity policies carry by deﬁ  nition the burden of their two seemingly conﬂ  icting objectives, 
that of achieving the objectives of the renewed Lisbon strategy and of modernizing the European 
social model. Flexicurity is required to address at the same time the socio-economic challenges of 
globalisation, and the widespread diffusion of new technologies and demographic ageing10, whilst 
providing a safety net to workers to help them become more ﬂ  exible and more “employable”.  As 
security for workers is no longer guaranteed from the stable employment relationship, a set of policy 
interventions is required that will support safe transitions from one job to another and from activity 
to inactivity and vice-versa.
3.2.  From job security to employment security
Job security, as it was understood in the 1970s and 1980s, as a more or less permanent full time 
job until retirement (with few-if any- spells of unemployment in between), now seems an impos-
sible target. Even the less rigid variant of a guaranteed job within the company in conjunction with 
changes in the task or job content and in working time (like the Japanese model of internal labour 
markets in the 1980s) is more or less a thing of the past. Instead, what workers can aspire to nowa-
days is a life-time security deriving from a sequence of different jobs (often requiring different skills) 
with different employers and safe labour market transitions. This shift towards a new type of em-
ployment-related security has been labeled as employment security in the EU jargon and is widely used in 
all labour market related policy documents. 11 Employment –or labour market- security is enhanced 
when workers are able to adapt to changes in economic conditions, and thus to labour market adjust-
ments, by constantly updating their skills through lifelong learning, and are willing to accept greater 
10  In 2006, 16.8% of the EU-27 population was aged over 65 years; this rate is expected to reach 25% by the end of the 
decade (Eurostat, 2008).
11  Auer considers misleading the use of the concept of “employment security” in the EU literature and policy agenda 
(including the ﬂ  exicurity agenda) and calls this shift from job security to a new type of security as labour market security, 
which combines some employment security within ﬁ  rms with security in transitions and mobility, in the form of 
active and passive labour market policies and social rights. He argues that in the transition phase (when a worker is 
unemployed), it is income and employability that may be protected –through labour market and welfare institutions- 
but not employment per se (Auer, 2008).Page ● 23
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geographical and professional mobility. Providing a smoother transition between jobs, or from work 
to non-work and vice versa, is one of the basic pillars of ﬂ  exicurity policies. 
However, this smooth transition is not available to all workers. A considerable share of the EU 
workforce is trapped into insecure and low quality jobs, with very few prospects of improving their 
employment status and upgrading their skills. According to the analysis of the ﬁ  ndings of an EU 
survey on the forms of employment integration in the EU-15 countries, in 2001 over half of the 
workforce was in low quality jobs, either secure, or insecure (Paugam & Zhou, 2007). 
Moving away from the quest for job security to that of employment security (or labour market secu-
rity) is not a question of an individual choice, not even so of business prerogative, 12 but rather of 
the prevailing institutional and labour market context. The expansion of precarious jobs is far from 
being compatible with increased workers’ employability. Insecure jobs provide fewer, if any, training 
opportunities; they are all too often associated with low pay, poor job satisfaction, greater difﬁ  culties 
in achieving work-life balance and a clustering of negative features that increase the vulnerability of 
workers and jeopardize their future employment prospects. The more insecure workers feel, the less 
employable they become.
Employment security is also affected by the prevailing degree of satisfaction with the society in 
which individuals live and their conﬁ  dence in the future. As the table below illustrates, the expecta-
tions from the future vary greatly in the EU-27 countries. Respondents from the majority of the 
“old” EU-15 countries are far more pessimistic about the future than those in the new members. 
12  Although some types of ﬁ  rms can enhance the employability of their workforce through continuous training and 
multitasking (e.g. the learning organization).Page ● 24
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Table 1: Overall, in 20 years’ time, would you say that people’s lives in your country will be better or
  worse than today? Would you say that you are very or fairly conﬁ  dent in having a job in
  2 year’s time?
 EU-27  countries
COUNTRY % worse than today
conﬁ  dence in having a 




Germany 67.8 48 2.21
Greece 66.9 37 2.83
France 64.3 45 3.05
Luxembourg 58.8 48 -
Italy 58.3 34 1.95
Belgium 57.9 49 2.18
UK 56.3 61 0.75
Austria 55.6 58 1.94
Portugal 53.2 39 3.46
Netherlands 38.3 62 2.12
Spain 37.4 43 3.05
Finland 37.3 59 2.02
Sweden 34.7 60 2.24
Denmark 32.4 61 1.42
Ireland 24.9 59 1.11
New members
Cyprus 54.9 44 -
Slovenia 45.2 41 -
Hungary 37.9 33 1.52
Czech Rep. 32.2 56 1.90
Malta 22.8 39 -
Poland 22.6 29 1.74
Lithuania 20.2 42 -
Bulgaria 19.9 27 -
Latvia 19.4 54 -
Slovakia 19.3 29 1.34
Romania 17.1 40 -
Estonia 11.3 45 -
Sources: Flash Eurobarometer no. 227, 2008 & Special Eurobarometer 26, 2006
OECD Stat Extracts, Dataset: Strictness of  EPL –overall (version 1). Available online:   
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos?Index.aspx?DatasetCode=EPL_OV Page ● 25
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It is interesting to note that: (a) a pessimistic attitude towards the future is closely linked to a low 
degree of conﬁ  dence in having a job in the near future, and that (b) the degree of employment pro-
tection (EPL index) does not seem to affect the level of peoples’ optimism about the future (compare 
for example Sweden and Denmark). Contrary to the argumentation commonly put forward by trade 
unions, the sense of security of workers is not boosted by strict employment protection legislation, 
in particular regarding dismissals (see for example Portugal and Greece); rather, it is boosted by active 
labour market policies and by an adequate level of unemployment insurance. As the Eurobarometer 
2006 ﬁ  ndings suggest,13 French and Portuguese workers with a high EPL-index (3.05 and 3.46 re-
spectively, see table above) rate their chances of ﬁ  nding a job within 6 months –if made redundant- 
signiﬁ  cantly lower, than Danish and Irish workers with a very moderate EPL- index (1.42 and 1.11 
respectively), who rate them very high (see Table 2).
Table 2: If you were to be laid-off, how would you rate the likelihood of ﬁ  nding a job in the next 6  




























Source: Special Eurobarometer 261, 2006
13  See Special Eurobarometer 261, 2006, p. 27Page ● 26
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It is no coincidence that , with the exception of Germany, those EU-15 countries that score 
low in the expectation of ﬁ  nding a job soon are also countries spending little on active labour mar-
ket measures: Portugal spends 0.70% of its GDP, Italy spends 0.59%, France 0.97%, and Greece a 
meager 0.17%. By contrast, Denmark devotes 1.83% of its GDP on active labour market policies 
(the highest amongst the EU and the OECD countries), the Netherlands 1.44% and Sweden 1.24%. 
It should be noted that high spending on active measures goes hand in hand with high spending in 
passive measures as well (unemployment beneﬁ  ts), indicating a dynamic and integrated approach to 
labour market problems (see Table 3).
Table 3: Public expenditure on labour market policies as a % of GDP, 2004
Country Active measures Passive measures Total
Austria 0.60 1.39 1.99
Belgium 1.15 2.41 3.56
Denmark 1.83 2.66 4.49
Finland 0.98 2.07 3.05
France 0.97 1.72 2.69
Germany 1.14 2.31 3.45
Greece * 0.17 0.45 0.62
Ireland 0.62 0.90 1.52
Italy 0.59 0.76 1.35
Netherlands 1.44 2.23 3.67
Portugal 0.70 1.31 2.01
Spain 0.72 1.50 2.22
Sweden 1.24 1.32 2.56
* ﬁ  gures for Greece do not include Public Employment Services and administration costs
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2006, Statistical Annex
So, moving away from the concept of job security towards the concept of employment (or labour 
market) security involves above all a commitment by governments to spend more on active labour 
markets and unemployment insurance, rather than focus on how to ease hiring and ﬁ  ring procedures, 
or facilitate the growth of precarious (and insecure) work. This is the most effective way to address 
the challenges of labour market segmentation and marginalization, but also of poor economic per-
formance.Page ● 27
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3.3.  Managing change and social risks
Among the most prominent new social risks is the sustainability of the social protection and wel-
fare systems, and labour market segmentation. The increasing number of precarious jobs in the EU 
economies, not only deprives a large segment of the workforce form basic employment and social 
security rights, but it puts into jeopardy the viability of the social security systems, as well as social 
cohesion. Lower incomes and unstable employment (e.g. ﬁ  xed-term contracts, on-call labour, small 
part-time jobs, etc.) are associated with a higher incidence of poverty. This in turn is translated into 
an increase in social spending. 
Social protection systems play a central role in addressing the short and long-term risks associ-
ated with precarious employment and unemployment. They not only provide a (varying) degree of 
compensation for the loss or reduction in income, they also (or at least, they are meant to) help in-
dividuals and families maintain a socially acceptable standard of living, regardless of labour market 
participation, 14 through various schemes of a minimum guaranteed income. The degree of security 
and the beneﬁ  ts provided, however, vary signiﬁ  cantly, depending on the welfare regime. Inclusive 
welfare regimes, like those prevailing in the Scandinavian countries, are more effective in reducing 
the level of insecurity and vulnerability of precarious workers and the unemployed, compared to the 
other types of welfare regimes. By contrast, the liberal market employment regime emerges as the 
most polarized, in terms of cumulative disadvantage for those trapped in insecure and poor quality 
jobs, whilst in the Southern European dualist employment regimes, informal family networks assume 
a signiﬁ  cant share of the welfare duties of a residual welfare state (see Diagram 4).
Diagram 4: Employment welfare regimes
Type of welfare regime
Forms of employment 
regulation
Level and form of social 
protection of the unemployed
inclusive regime
- Scandinavian (social 
democratic)
high degree of institutionalized 
protection
liberal “market” regime - Anglo-Saxon minimal protection
dualist employment regimes
- continental (corporatist)
- Southern European  
   (Mediterranean)
insurance- based, employment-
centered protection
sub-protective (importance of 
family and informal networks)
Source: Paugam & Zhou, 2007
14  This is termed decommodiﬁ  cation (Esping-Andersen in Eurofound, 2007). Page ● 28
Aliki Mouriki
Another advantage of the Scandinavian type of welfare regime is that it is not incompatible 
with a dynamic and well-functioning labour market, suggesting that government spending on well-
functioning welfare services should not be viewed as a cost, but rather as an investment.
“Inclusive employment regimes, with a high degree of  centralization of  collective bargain-
ing and strong welfare and quality of  work policies, tend to create an environment that is 
most conducive to the integration of  employees into the labour market”. (Paugam & Zhou, 
2007)Page ● 29
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The EU ﬂ  exicurity agenda: in search  4. 
of the appropriate policy mix that 
balances ﬂ  exibility and security
The key components of the EU ﬂ  exicurity strategy 4.1. 
The European Commission, following a lengthy process of consultation and study, has estab-
lished in 2007 the key components and the main guiding principles of the ﬂ  exicurity strategy. 15 It 
outlines the following 4 key policy components:
ﬂ  exible and variable contractual arrangements from the perspective o f both employers and  a) 
employees, “insiders” and “outsiders”;
comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, to ensure the continuous adaptability and employ- b) 
ability of workers, especially of the most vulnerable ones;
effective labour market policies, that help people cope with rapid change, reduce unemploy- c) 
ment spells and ease transitions to new jobs; and
modern social security systems, that provide adequate income support, encourage employ- d) 
ment and facilitate labour market mobility, as well as work.
The above components must be mutually supportive so as to produce the optimum result. And 
they must be guided by a set of common principles that will act as reference points for the member-
states:
to pursue comprehensive labour market policies that promote ﬂ  exible and reliable contractual  1) 
arrangements, effective active labour market measures and modern social security systems;
to strike a balance between rights and responsibilities for all social actors involved: employers,  2) 
workers, job-seekers and public authorities;
to accept that there is not one single policy strategy towards ﬂ  exicurity: each country should  3) 
adapt it to its particular circumstances and institutions;
15  European Commission, 2007bPage ● 30
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to reduce the divide between “insiders” and “outsiders”, by preparing the former for job  4) 
transitions, whilst giving the latter easy entry points;
to promote internal, as well as external ﬂ  exicurity; 5) 
to enhance gender equality by giving equal access to quality employment for women and men,  6) 
and by offering possibilities to reconcile work and family life;
to create a climate of trust and dialogue between the public authorities and the social part- 7) 
ners; and
to contribute to sound and ﬁ  nancially sustainable budgetary policies, and a fair distribution  8) 
of costs and beneﬁ  ts. 
In order to achieve these ambitious goals, the EU member states are urged to:
put emphasis on active labour market policies, especially in the improvement of pub-   ●
lic employment services, to ensure the short duration of unemployment spells and the 
matching of skills to demand;
encourage lifelong learning for workers: continuous vocational training can provide trans-   ●
ferable skills and thus increase employability, whilst a well educated workforce is often 
more productive and less likely to be trapped into poor quality work; 
provide income security, rather than job security, through generous and inclusive social    ●
protection systems: social security systems have to be adapted to suit the needs of the 
ﬂ  exible workforce, ensuring that even the non-standard forms of employment insertion 
are covered by minimum social rights;
provide family-friendly policies to achieve a work-life balance, through mutually beneﬁ  -   ●
cial working arrangements that take into account the changing needs of the workforce 
throughout its life course;
enhance the mutual trust between workers and employers: including the trade unions in    ●
policy formulation will increase the willingness of workers to accept ﬂ  exicurity arrange-
ments and will ensure the balancing of different needs.Page ● 31
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Diagram 5: Key components of the EU ﬂ  exicurity strategy
Policy components Aims  Policy tools
ﬂ  exible and reliable contractual 
arrangements (from the 
perspective of both employers 
and employees, “insiders” and 
“outsiders”)
to ﬁ  ght against labour  • 
market segmentation
modernization of labour  • 
law, relaxation of EPL
collective agreements • 
modernize work  • 
organization
comprehensive  and responsive 
lifelong learning strategies 
to keep the skills of  • 
workers (especially the 
more vulnerable ones) up 
to date
high quality initial  • 
education, broad key 
competences
continuous training • 
effective active labour market 
policies 
help reintegrate people  • 
into employment 
help people cope with  • 
rapid change
support safe transitions  • 
 job placement services • 
 training programs • 
job creation schemes • 
work incentives • 
modern social security systems  provide people with  • 
income security and 
support (disability, long-
term care)
facilitate transitions to  • 
new jobs, through efﬁ  cient 
job search assistance and 
ﬁ  nan-cial incentives (balan-
ce between rights and 
obligations)
enhance work / life  • 
balance
adequate unemployment  • 
beneﬁ  ts
healthcare beneﬁ  ts • 
pensions • 
childcare • 
Source:   Adapted by author from Eurofound, 2008, “Employment security and employability: a contribution to the ﬂ exicurity
   debate” and European Commission, 2007b, “Towards Common Principles of  Flexicurity”
The speciﬁ  c combinations and sequences of policies will of course depend on the particular 
socio-economic and cultural circumstances prevailing in each country. The degree, to which the 
outcome of these policy conﬁ  gurations could be identiﬁ  ed as a ﬂ  exicurity policy needs, however, to 
be put into question. Moreover, although the key policy components of the EU ﬂ  exicurity strategy 
and its stated aims are hardly contested by anyone, it is the speciﬁ  c content and mix of the policy 
measures that arouse the most controversy.Page ● 32
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4.2.  Four typical pathways to ﬂ  exicurity
Conscious of the diversity of labour market and welfare regimes prevailing across the EU, the 
European Commission suggests four typical pathways to ﬂ exicurity, depending on the challenges that 
each country has to address. 16
The ﬁ  rst pathway aims at tackling contractual segmentation. It is useful for countries with segment-
ed labour markets, with insiders and outsiders, as it would permit them to distribute ﬂ  exibility and se-
curity more evenly over the workforce. This could happen, for example, by providing entry ports into 
employment for newcomers and promote their progress into better jobs. In these countries, security 
tends to rely on job protection rather than social beneﬁ  ts; unemployment beneﬁ  ts are low and social 
assistance systems are weak. Effective measures to address the issue of contractual segmentation 
could include improving the position of workers on ﬁ  xed-term contracts, agency work, on-call work, 
etc. by offering them adequate protection and minimum rights, training opportunities, and social se-
curity rights with portability of entitlements (see for example the relevant Dutch experience). 
In this respect, an interesting idea that is worth further consideration is put forward by the Com-
mission. The consecutive use of ﬁ  xed-term contracts could be restricted through legislation and 
collective agreements, whilst the open-ended contracts could be redesigned so as to include a pro-
gressive built-up of job protection: it could start with a basic level of job protection and protection 
would gradually increase with job tenure, until full protection is achieved. This is termed the “tenure 
track approach” that guarantees an automatic progress into better contractual conditions (European 
Commission, 2007b).
The second pathway suggested aims at developing ﬂ  exicurity within the enterprise and offering 
transition security. This pathway is useful for countries with low job ﬂ  ows, as it would allow workers 
to continuously update their skills, but also provide safe and successful transitions to another job, 
thus enhancing the mobility between the companies /organizations. The measures proposed in this 
pathway include a continuous investment in lifelong learning policies, preventive actions to avoid re-
dundancies or long-term unemployment, joint initiatives by all parties concerned in organizing safe
16 Ibid.Page ● 33
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 transitions, cooperation between ﬁ  rms in deﬁ  ning skill requirements and establishing skill de-
velopment programmes, and conditionality of unemployment beneﬁ  ts as well as monitoring of job 
search efforts. 17
The third pathway aims at tackling skills and opportunity gaps among the workforce and is useful 
for countries where there exist large skills and opportunities gaps among the population, in view of 
helping low skilled people to develop their skills and enter into employment. The measures that could 
help in this direction should focus at addressing the opportunity gaps at an early stage, in the initial 
education system, and at strengthening the skills of the low-skilled workforce through coordinated 
actions (e.g. validation of informal training, combination of work and training, introduction of indi-
vidual training accounts, tax incentives to enterprises to develop comprehensive skills strategies, etc.). 
The overarching aim of these measures should be to enhance upward social mobility and avoid the 
problem of the working poor.  
The fourth pathway relates to improving opportunities for beneﬁ  t recipients and informally em-
ployed workers. It is useful for countries that have recently gone through a major restructuring and 
thus have large numbers of people on long-term beneﬁ  ts with few chances of returning to paid em-
ployment. This pathway puts emphasis on measures that facilitate the shift from informal to formal 
employment through effective labour market policies, labour taxation reforms, and a more stringent 
monitoring system to combat informal work. Regularizing informal work could be made more attrac-
tive by improving informal workers’ rights and providing access to professional training. At the same 
time, measures to deter unemployed workers from taking up an informal job could be contemplated, 
such as the increase of the unemployment beneﬁ  t to an adequate level, the conditionality of beneﬁ  ts, 
tailor-made job assistance to more vulnerable groups, more effective public employment services, 
etc. The strengthening of bipartite and tripartite social dialogue structures should also be able to help 
towards achieving this goal. 
17  The Commission’s document does not make any mention, of course, of the excesses often involved in and the short-
comings of this monitoring system.Page ● 34
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The policies suggested above entail, of course, a substantial economic cost. Labour market poli-
cies in particular- both active and passive- require a lot of extra government spending, in terms of 
more efﬁ  cient public employment services, updating of skills, job creation and adequate levels of 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts; the same is true for improved welfare services (social beneﬁ  ts, maternity and 
parental leave, childcare and elderly care, early retirement schemes, etc.). The ﬁ  nancial dimension is 
a source of major concern particularly in periods of recession and in countries that simply lack the 
extra resources required to fund these policies.  
4.3.   Compensating mechanisms and trade-offs 
A major feature of the ﬂ  exicurity policies is the need to strike a balance between the conﬂ  icting 
interests of business and labour and to compensate the latter for accepting more uncertainty, in the 
form of more ﬂ  exibility, to the beneﬁ  t of the former. This is, by no means, an easy endeavour as it 
involves accommodating diverging and often conﬂ  icting interests, both between as well as within 
the social partners’ organizations. The diagram below illustrates the potential “give-and-take” be-
tween business and labour. Companies are eager to increase the numerical ﬂ  exibility of their work-
force, i.e. to ﬂ  uctuate the number of workers and of hours worked according to demand, through 
easy hiring and ﬁ  ring procedures, whilst workers are willing to accept some form of uncertainty if 
they are backed up by efﬁ  cient labour market policies, both active and passive. Functional ﬂ  exibility 
(i.e. multi-skilling, professional mobility, etc.) would be more acceptable by workers, but only ﬁ  rms 
with the appropriate work organization could offer it. 
- income security 
       (UB, social benefits, 
        minimum wage) 
 
     - employment security  
      (active labour market 
        policies, LLL) 
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Arriving at a “win-win” solution for both sides implies accepting sacriﬁ  ces on behalf of both 
negotiating parties, not only labour, and this cannot only result from a process of hard, but fair 
bargaining, a “quid pro quo”: ﬁ  rms relinquish some of the desired ﬂ  exibility and workers relinquish 
some degree of job protection, pay compensation, or employment right. It is not unusual, when ne-
gotiations arrive at a deadlock or face difﬁ  culties, to down-play some of the problems, or even worst, 
hide them “under the rag”, only to see them re-emerge more saliently on the ﬁ  rst occasion.
Trade-offs need to take place both at the macro-level (institutions), as well as the micro-level (com-
panies and organizations). Unless backed up by state policies and ﬁ  nance, concessions from either 
workers or companies, cannot be sustainable. At the aggregate level a common trade off is between 
job security and employment security: a low degree of employment protection is offset by generous 
unemployment insurance and effective active labour market measures. 18  Increased ﬂ  ows between 
employment and unemployment become more acceptable to workers if the level of unemployment 
compensation is satisfactory and if there exist opportunities for upgrading the skills of the unem-
ployed. Another example of a negotiated trade-off at the macro-level is the relaxation in dismissal 
protection legislation for regular employees in exchange for a stricter regulation of temporary agency 
work.
At the micro-level, trade-offs between employers and employees can take several forms. The 
most common are:
the provision by companies of various types of leave to their workforce (parental, educa-   ●
tional, personal) in return for state subsidies; 
greater working time ﬂ  exibility, in return for safeguarding jobs;   ●
greater functional ﬂ  exibility (multi-skilling, task rotation), in return for job security;   ●
the reduction of working hours in return for working hours ﬂ  exibility and reduced pre-   ●
mium pay for overtime work.
18  Inversely, in different institutional environments, a strict employment protection legislation (especially for standard 
employees) is usually counter-balanced by minimal unemployment insurance, poor activation policies and few training 
opportunities.Page ● 36
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5. Not  a  “one-size-ﬁ  ts all” model
The markedly different starting points of the EU countries, and the huge divergences in their so-
cio-economic, institutional and cultural backgrounds, explain the great variety of national approaches 
to ﬂ  exicurity. As a recent Eurofound document puts it:19
The choice of  a particular form of  ﬂ exicurity is linked primarily to the historical development 
of  labour markets, collective agreements and the role of  the government in these, as well as 
to basic considerations of  public policy in the employment and social protection areas. 
This section brieﬂ  y examines the different approaches to ﬂ  exicurity within the EU countries and 
questions the transferability of national experiences.
 
5.1.  An “ideal type” of a ﬂ  exicurity system: the Danish 
model 
Ideally, a successful ﬂ  exicurity strategy would approximate OECD’s concept as a set of policy 
measures with the following characteristics:
a moderate Employment Protection Legislation   ●
a high rate of participation of the workforce in lifelong learning programmes   ●
high government spending on active and passive labour market policies   ●
generous unemployment beneﬁ  t systems balancing rights and duties of the workers   ●
broad coverage of the social security systems (an adequate safety net)   ●
and a high rate of trade union density.   ●
Madsen (2006) outlines the common principles that should underlie all ﬂ  exicurity arrangements:
the principle of  a)  integrating ﬂ exibility and security, so that some form of ﬂ  exibility is combined 
with some form of security, thus providing a safety net. This implies the accommodation of 
conﬂ  icting interests through compensating mechanisms, the use of well deﬁ  ned arrangements
and instruments, and clearly spelled out distributional aspects;
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the principle of  b)  negotiated trade-offs, implying that the employees who accept increased uncer-
tainty in their working life receive some compensation in the form of extra security. This 
principle pre-supposes the participation of all relevant stakeholders in the decision-making 
progress, political guarantees to ensure the implementation of the ﬂ  exicurity strategy over 
time and transparency regarding the distribution of gains and losses;
the principle of  c)  sustainable employment for all, including the weakest segments of the popula-
tion, in view of enhancing social cohesion. To this end, the ﬂ  exicurity strategy should aim at 
improving the distribution of welfare and living conditions, as well as empowering weaker 
groups to cope with their situation.
The country that is unmistakably always taken as a ‘role model’ in this context is Denmark, as it 
complies fully with all of the above criteria. The Danish “ﬂ  exicurity model” can be described as a hy-
brid system, combining characteristics from the Scandinavian welfare state with a liberal employment 
regime. The term “ﬂ  exicurity” in fact only describes some long-standing labour market practices 
rather than a deliberate strategy to comply with the pre-requisites of a model construction.
According to the European Flexicurity Expert Group, the success of the Danish ﬂ  exicurity system is 
a result of combining adequate unemployment insurance, relative ﬂ  exible labour laws and efforts to 
help people ﬁ  nd jobs, as well as a very highly developed industrial relations system and social dialogue 
culture (European Commission, 2007).  Its three basic components –high labour mobility (the result 
of low employment protection, even for permanent employment), strong activation policies, and 
generous social beneﬁ  ts- form the so-called “golden triangle” (see Diagram 6). 
The main elements of this model are a high investment on active labour market policies, with a 
particularly strong emphasis on lifelong learning; generous social security systems enabling easy and 
safe transitions between different employment contracts and jobs; and a long tradition of social dia-
logue, based on mutual trust. The philosophy underpinning the Danish labour market approach can 
be summed up in the slogan “protect workers, not jobs”. The ﬂ  ip side of the coin is that this “golden 
triangle” is mostly tailored to the proﬁ  le of highly skilled, mobile and ﬂ  exible workers who are able 
to switch jobs and job functions easily. Page ● 39
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Diagram 6: The Danish “golden triangle” 
Low employment protection legislation
Active labour market policies                                                  Generous social beneﬁ  ts
Despite the fact that some segments of the workforce fall outside the borders of this golden tri-
angle, in particular unskilled and older workers and newly arrived immigrants, it has not led to labour 
market segmentation and the emergence of in-work poverty, as has been the case in many liberal 
economies (Viebrock & Clasen, 2009). The question inevitably arises: is this Danish “success story” 
transferable to the other EU countries and what lessons can be drawn from it?
Some scholars claim that the Danish ﬂ  exicurity model would be difﬁ  cult to sustain in countries 
which lack a strong ‘public-spiritedness’ (reﬂ  ected in the low inclination to cheat on social  beneﬁ  t 
systems), or without strong public enforcement mechanisms that control for moral hazard in a gen-
erous and efﬁ  cient social security system (Viebrock & Clasen, 2009). Apart from civic attitudes and 
mentality, there are other factors at play that make the Danish model unique. As Bredgaard, Larsen 
and Madsen (2005) point out, Denmark’s positive labour market and overall growth performance is 
the result of a long evolutionary process, rooted in particular historical pre-conditions and ﬁ  rmly 
supported by stable state institutions and social compromises between capital and labour; the capac-
ity for change and the adaptability of both businesses and workers, their involvement in the drafting 
and implementation of legislation, and the increased sense of responsibility of the trade unions 
towards economic development, have been at the heart of the Danish success. The resilience of the 
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Danish ﬂ  exicurity model in a context of a more and more open economy, will depend on its (so far 
outstanding) ability to maintain the balance between social and political compromises.
5.2.   Learning from the others
Paugam & Zhou (2007) dismiss as utopian the idea that the Danish ﬂ  exicurity model can be 
transferred to other countries in some pure and simple form, as the institutional context in other 
countries is very different. The most marked features of the Danish model –namely:
the culture of collective negotiation between the social partners without the mediation of    ●
the state,
the search of compromise between the divergent interests,    ●
the endorsement of the principle of the collective rather than the individual well-being    ●
(which is translated into a widespread consensus that high taxation is the means to 
achieve and maintain the high standards of the welfare state)
and the long-term approach to problem solving, without taking into consideration the    ●
immediate political cost, 
are rarely encountered outside the Scandinavian countries. In continental Europe and in its Southern 
part in particular, it is rare to encounter any of these features, let alone their concurrence. Any at-
tempt to replicate this model elsewhere –except perhaps for the other Nordic countries- would be an 
impossible challenge, according to the authors. However, it is possible to look for functional equivalents 
of the Danish model in the spheres of training, long-term investment in education and lifelong 
learning, in collective bargaining and in ﬁ  ghting against the poor quality of work (Paugam & Zhou, 
2007). 20 
A more “transferable” experience is perhaps the Dutch approach to ﬂ  exicurity. The Netherlands 
chose a different pathway to increase labour market ﬂ  exibility and address the challenges of econom-
ic restructuring in the late 1980s and the 1990s, that of upgrading, or “normalizing” the employment 
and social security rights of atypical workers (Visser, 2002). In 1997, the “Flexibility and Security Bill” 
introduced drastic changes to the previous system of dismissal law and regulation that offered in-
20  One could also add in the list of Danish (and Scandinavian) transferable good practices the provision of good quality 
and affordable child-care, and of generous parental leave schemes. Page ● 41
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creased protection for regular workers and no protection to ﬂ  exible workers: the Bill slightly reduced 
dismissal protection for standard workers, whilst it improved security for non-standard workers, es-
pecially part-time workers (Viebrock & Clasen, 2009).
Part-time work, especially for women, was perceived as an answer both to the need of business 
to adjust labour to the economic ﬂ  uctuations, as well as to requests by a growing share of the female 
workforce to work reduced hours, and thus reconcile their conﬂ  icting work-life balance requirements. 
Following long negotiations between the social partners (with the active involvement of female union 
members) an agreement was reached to increase the attractiveness of part-time work by providing 
equal treatment to part-workers with full-time workers, on a pro-rata basis, in return for greater work-
ing hours’ ﬂ  exibility. During the 1990s, any discriminatory clauses in collective agreements marginal-
izing part-time jobs in terms of training opportunities, early retirement, taxation, and redundancy 
schemes were eventually removed (Tijdens, 2005). The principle of equal treatment of non-standard 
employment patterns was later extended to temporary work, whose level of protection substantially 
improved. The “Flexibility and Security Act” (1999) strengthened the position of temporary workers 
by reducing precariousness and gave employment and social security rights (including training oppor-
tunities, career development and supplementary pensions) to temporary agency workers, reﬂ  ecting 
a balanced approach to ﬂ  exicurity measures. More recently, with the 2000 “Adjustment of Working 
Hours Act” employees were given the right to request an adjustment of their working time (an in-
crease or a decrease), according to their needs. The employer usually has to accept the request, unless 
there are serious budgetary or organizational constraints (ibid.).21
The EU countries can also learn from policy measures that have been adopted in other countries 
- either through legislation, or following collective labour agreements - and have proved successful 
in coping with labour market and social protection problems. These initiatives do not necessarily 
constitute a rational or deliberate policy choice to promote ﬂ  exicurity per se; rather, they constitute 
attempts to enhance competitiveness and social cohesion, but also to address economic under-per-
21   See section 6 for a more detailed account of the Dutch experience.Page ● 42
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formance, labour market distortions, social problems or budgetary constraints. For consistency and 
comparison purposes, however, we will label them as “ﬂ  exicurity” policies (see Diagram 7).  
Diagram 7
EFFECTIVE FLEXICURITY POLICIES IN EU COUNTRIES
AUSTRIA new system of severance pay (2003): establishment of a personalized  • 
account held by the worker and ﬁ  nanced by the employer. Workers can 
draw from this account in case of a dismissal or a change in their job. 
They can also transfer their entitlements to their new job
the Labour Foundations serve as transition agencies to support job-to-job  • 
placement in case of a threat of collective dismissals
extension of severance pay to self-employed • 
possibility to switch temporarily to part-time work for parents with  • 
children under 7 years of age
special programmes for vulnerable groups (young and older workers,  • 
women, unskilled workers, unemployed)
extension of SS coverage to those on “free service contracts”  • 
paid study /training leave for up to 12 months without additional costs for  • 
the employer (covered by UB)
working time ﬂ  exibility through collective agreement  • 
BELGIUM  “time credit” agreement concluded between the social partners in the  • 
private sector, providing greater individual working time
rules to avoid abuse in the use of successive ﬁ  xed-term employment  • 
contracts (in certain sectors) 
establishment of “training centres”at the company level • 
DENMARK the “golden triangle”= ﬂ  exible contractual arrangements, extensive active  • 
labour market policies and generous social security and welfare systems
the LLL system is well developed: a high proportion of employees receive  • 
further training
employees are entitled to at least 14 days of further training annually • 
subsidised jobs for the unemployed and assistance in job search • 
high UB (90% for lower incomes, up to 4 years) for those actively looking  • 
for a job
the job rotation system stimulates the development of skills • 
ESTONIA new employment initiatives for people with disabilities (personalized job  • 
search plan, adaptation of workplace premises and equipment to their 
needs, assistance with job interviews)
FRANCE 2008 national cross-industry agreement introduces new way of  • 
terminating employment contracts, through negotiated agreement
a “contrat de transition professionnelle”(CTP) is offered to workers made  • 
redundant for economic reasons; the 12-month long contract provides the 
jobseeker with training, while paying him/her 80% of the previous salary 
received
individual right to training enhanced through new agreement on  • 
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FINLAND “change security” concept introduced: this consists of paid time off  • 
for workers during their notice period to look for jobs, an employment 
programme,  an increased obligation of employers to inform and 
negotiate and more effective employment services 
limitations in the use of successive ﬁ  xed-term contracts and stricter  • 
control over temporary work
more security introduced for atypical workers (paid sick leave, study leave,  • 
annual holiday compensation)
individualized employment services • 
new system to assist workers involved in redundancy pro-cedures (action  • 
plans, training opportunities, enhanced UB)
introduction of working time accounts and the annualisation of working  • 
time in sectors with seasonal ﬂ  uctuations
GERMANY individualized working time accounts introduced: about 40% of the  • 
employees are covered by this system, which allows them to switch from 
FT to PT, reduce their working hours and accumulate hours (and money) 
to use for early retirement or sabbaticals
HUNGARY the 2003 Labour Code allows employees to request a modiﬁ  cation of their  • 
working time (from FT to PT, and vice-versa)
26 weeks of paid maternity leave and 2 years of paid (at 70%) parental  • 
leave
various ﬂ  exible retirement schemes • 
IRELAND national workplace strategy launched to identify how can key challenges  • 
be jointly addressed by the social partners by managing change and 
innovation (2005)
the “Towards 2016”social partner agreement identiﬁ  es the need for greater  • 
participation, productivity and activation, with greater focus on the more 
disadvantaged groups in the labour market and on workplace learning  
(2006)
introduction of 2 new bills to enhance enforcement of labour legislation  • 
and set more stringent rules for employment agencies
workplace upskilling initiatives, with the involvement of employers and  • 
unions
ITALY measures to stabilize “atypical” employment and income support for the  • 
most disadvantaged groups
2008 Finance Act improves protection of the unemployed, without  • 
changing the eligibility criteria: extension of beneﬁ  t period, increase in the 
replacement rate 
active labour market policies have been devolved to regions • 
accredited private employment agencies are authorised to engage in a  • 
number of activities 
LUXEMBOURG restructuring companies obliged to establish a job retention plan, in view  • 
of minimizing the number of redundant workers: partial unemployment, 
reduced working hours, voluntary PT work, training initiatives to support 
redeployment or outplacement
economic incentives to private employers to recruit older workers • 
unemployed people who accept a job that is paid less than their previous  • 
one, are entitled an income supplement  Page ● 44
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NETHERLANDS the “Flexibility and Security Act” (1999) strengthened the position of  • 
temporary workers by reducing precariousness and gave employment and 
SS rights to temporary agency workers
more protection for temporary agency workers and limitations to the use  • 
of successive ﬁ  xed-term contracts
part-time workers guaranteed equal treatment in conditions of  • 
employment
employees entitled to request an adjustment of working time (an increase  • 
or a decrease), according to their needs
support in the transition from school to work  • 
40% of all workers are covered by a training fund • 
economic incentives to recruit long-term unemployed work • 
PORTUGAL duration of unemployment beneﬁ  t increased for older workers above 45  • 
years
SPAIN ﬁ  xed-term contracts  automatically transformed into open-ended contracts  • 
after 24 months of service with the same employer, following a tripartite 
agreement in 2006 to reduce the use of temporary work
workers entitled to individual training leave, with companies training  • 
initiatives receiving subsidies and SS allowances
2007 law on equality provides workers with the right to reduce and adapt  • 
their working time schedules according to family responsibilities
SS coverage extended to the self-employed workers (3 m.)  • 
SWEDEN introduction (through collective agreements) of career transition  • 
agreements to support workers if made redundant (counseling, guidance, 
career orientation, training, etc.)
UK ﬂ  exible working hours can be requested by employees caring for  • 
dependent family members (2003); maternity pay has improved
the emphasis on LLL has been greatly increased • 
individual support to job seekers • 
a tax credit system has been introduced, aiming to support the  • 
employment of speciﬁ  c groups of job seekers. 
Source: Eurofound, 2008b
In many instances, the policy outcome of the ﬂ  exicurity measures introduced in recent years has 
far from been positive on employees. The most prominent example is that in some countries, access 
to unemployment beneﬁ  t has become conditional on certain obligations, thus making it possible 
to impose sanctions in the case of unemployed persons who decline the offer of a job, or do not 
participate in the activities proposed by the unemployment centres (Belgium, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal, UK). Elsewhere, the eligibility criteria for receiving unemployment beneﬁ  t have become more 
stringent (Finland, the Netherlands), or the duration of the beneﬁ  t period has been cut short for 
certain age groups (Portugal). Other initiatives that can be considered as having a negative impact on 
employees is the simpliﬁ  cation of procedures and relaxation of constraints for individual dismissals 
(Portugal), the imposition of stricter eligibility criteria for receiving a training allowance (Germany), 
the reduction of unemployment beneﬁ  ts through their integration into the welfare system (Ger-Page ● 45
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many), the abolition of incentives for early retirement (Netherlands) and the reduction of obligatory 
severance pay (Spain).22  Often these unfavourable towards labour measures are introduced to offset 
other more positive measures, but they also reﬂ  ect the tendency for severe cuts in government social 
spending.
A closer look at the aforementioned policy measures indicates that, despite their notable differ-
ences, there emerge a number of common policy features across the EU countries:
an absence of radical measures, suggesting that cautious and incremental initiatives are    ●
preferred to more spectacular and far-reaching reforms;
an absence of polarization in the direction of either too much ﬂ  exibility or too much    ●
security, reﬂ  ecting the concerns of trade unions, on one hand, to avoid further labour 
market deregulation, and of businesses, on the other,  to minimize rigidities and costs;
a common trend to provide more security for non-standard employment and to reduce    ●
excessive precariousness;
a concern with reducing business costs as well as social spending;   ●
a focus on lifelong learning policies and on job transitions (training initiatives, incentives    ●
to take up job offers, improvement of employment services);
a top-down approach in many countries: ﬂ  exicurity is not endorsed as a mainstream    ●
policy but rather as an obligation to comply with the requirements of the European 
Employment Strategy. As a result, rather than an integrated approach, piece-meal and 
fragmentary measures are often promoted.
5.3.  Ardent supporters, reluctant followers and the front of 
rejection
Despite its high degree of institutionalization at various policy levels (the EU, the OECD, the 
ILO), the ﬂ  exicurity agenda is far from being undisputed. As one would expect, the degree of en-
dorsement of the EU ﬂ  exicurity agenda varies greatly, both across countries and sectors as well as 
within.  Businesses, in general, are in favour of ﬂ  exicurity and they consider it as “an appealing concept
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because it offers a way to restore a positive  link between competitiveness and social protection (…) 
Finding new ways to combine social protection and economic ﬂ  exibility is fundamental to more 
and higher-productivity jobs.” (M. Stocker, advisor to Business Europe, in Euro Activ, September 
2007, mentioned in Auer, 2008).” Both peak-level European business organisations, BusinessEurope 
(former UNICE) representing the large ﬁ  rms and UEAPME, representing the interests of SMEs, 
have endorsed the ﬂ  exicurity agenda.
At the national policy level, one can distinguish largely between three groups of countries: the 
ﬁ  rst group consists of the countries that have already gone a long way in promoting ﬂ  exicurity poli-
cies, even without the incitation of the EU (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Austria) 
23; the second group consists of countries that follow their own idiosyncratic path to address their 
economic and labour market  problems like France 24, or that have to a varying degree been more or 
less consistently pursuing policies balancing the ﬂ  exibility needs of businesses to the security needs 
of the workforce (Germany, Belgium); and the third group comprises the countries that are reluc-
tantly complying with the objectives of the Social Agenda, the European Employment Strategy and, 
above all, the renewed Lisbon targets and are doing the minimum that is required from them in order 
to avoid the sanctions imposed by the EU (Greece, Portugal, Spain –until recently-25  and Italy, as well 
as some of the new member states). These countries - either owing to a lack of political consensus 
or/and their traditional socio-economic and institutional structures- are unable to pursue a coherent 
policy to address the urgent economic and labour market challenges, and are simply trying to buy 
time in order to delay painful reforms and difﬁ  cult decisions.  
The diversity of national responses to the EU ﬂ  exicurity policy agenda is best illustrated in Auer’s 
representation of the clustering of ﬂ  exicurity countries (see Diagram 8). His clustering is based on 8 
variables that are used as proxies for ﬂ  exibility and security: working time ﬂ  exibility, work organiza-
tion, average employment tenure, EPL for regular and temporary jobs, labour market expenditure 
23  One could also include in this group the UK, with one of the most lightly regulated labour markets among the 
OECD countries; however, its ﬂ  exicurity approach draws many criticisms, as it puts signiﬁ  cantly more emphasis on 
the ﬂ  exibility aspect rather than the security one, thus increasing social inequalities and job dissatisfaction. The same 
comment applies, to a lesser degree, to Ireland.
24  Auer mentions the recent French agreement on “the modernisation of the labour market”, the French response to the 
ﬂ  exicurity agenda that contains both aspects of national idiosyncrasy and policy measures of a more general stance 
like portability and individual rights (Auer, 2008). 
25  Spain has recently introduced a number of initiatives that enhance the rights of atypical workers and increase employ-
ability (see Diagram 6 above).Page ● 47
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Source: Auer, “The politics in the political economy of  ﬂ exicurity”, 2008
The ﬂ  exicurity policy agenda is put into question by a number of critics that include trade unions, 
political parties, segments of the workforce, business sectors and individual scholars who –for dif-
ferent reasons- do not share the enthusiasm of the ﬂ  exicurity supporters, or who even dismiss the 
ﬂ  exicurity agenda altogether. Page ● 48
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From the labour perspective, those who are skeptical or dismissive of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda em-
phasize the fact that the existing systems of employment protection do not prevent a large number 
of European ﬁ  rms to engage in structural change, nor the creation of new jobs; despite having a 
more regulated labour market than in the US, European economies have the same rate of job crea-
tion and job destruction, with more protection for workers. Moreover, business is already enjoying 
historically high proﬁ  ts, so why this urge for more ﬂ  exibility? Cutting wage costs and competing for 
the low skilled does not –according to this line of argument- lead to more and better jobs, rather, it 
is moving up the value added chain that constitutes the best reply to the challenges of globalisation 
(ETUC, 2008). A further point of union criticism is that while ﬂ  exibility is usually realized through 
cuts in employment protection, the compensations in terms of safety for workers remain uncertain 
(see Auer, 2008). 26 Concerns are raised, also, by low skilled workers enjoying relative employment 
protection, who are reluctant to relinquish their current sense of security for the uncertain gains of 
becoming more ﬂ  exible, even if this would be translated into more jobs or into safeguarding their 
own job in the long-term. Finally, the ﬁ  ercest opponents of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda include those 
unions and political parties who see it as an attempt to dismantle what is left of job protection and 
engage into a “race to the bottom” that could only lead to further labour exploitation, thus becoming 
“ﬂ  exploitation”. 27
From the business perspective, ﬂ  exicurity is not popular across the board. A large number of SMEs 
and traditional industry sectors prefer the “security” of their traditional / taylorist work organization 
practices-based on low wages and the low skills’ content of the job, long working hours, rigid pay 
scales, and job protection for the core workforce- rather than the uncertainties and the investment 
involved in innovation and in adopting new forms of work organization. 28 Micro-ﬁ  rms in particular, 
face considerable difﬁ  culties in adapting to the new challenges with employee-oriented measures that 
might drive them out of business altogether.
26  However, Danish trade unions openly support the Danish ﬂ  exicurity model, whilst Dutch unions, sceptical at ﬁ  rst, 
eventually endorsed and promoted ﬂ  exible employment, as part-time work became increasingly popular. 
27  Trade unions in Portugal and Greece adopt a similar stance, as well as some traditional left parties. In Germany too, 
trade unions tend to view ﬂ  exicurity as a disguise for job de-regulation, despite a number of agreements concluded at 
the ﬁ  rm level (Leschke et al., 2006).
28  The new forms of work organisation require a signiﬁ  cant innovative capacity on behalf of the ﬁ  rm, a continuous 
updating of the skills of the workforce, a ﬂ  attening of work hierarchies, team working, task rotation, multiskilling of 
employees, job enrichment, etc., all of which involve  substantial risks and additional costs for the ﬁ  rm.Page ● 49
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Finally, from an academic point of view, critical approaches to the ﬂ  exicurity paradigm often go 
hand-in-hand with a criticism of the ambiguities of the European Employment Strategy and low ap-
proval rates of the European Commission’s policies in general. Hyman, for example, points out that 
the EU discussion of labour market challenges pushes under the carpet a number of crucial issues 
and fundamental dilemmas, in order to reach a common agreement based on the lower common 
denominator. He fears that the European social model is under increased pressure by what he calls 
the “Wal-Mart model” (an exemplar of ruthless high-scale employer) that identiﬁ  es ﬂ  exibility with 
disposable labour, elastic hours and open-ended tasks, rather than choice, status and discretion, which 
are his vision of ﬂ  exibility- a synthesis of work and life, fostering the diversity of social productiv-
ity and enabling individuals to pursue a ﬂ  exible life time distribution of their contribution to society 
(Hyman, 2003). A more moderate critical approach stresses the fact that the ﬂ  exicurity agenda is not 
applicable in countries with a residual, sub-protective social welfare system and an adversarial indus-
trial relations context with a long tradition of mutual social mistrust.Page ● 50
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6.  The national context and its impact 
on the conﬁ  guration of ﬂ  exicurity 
policies through a comparative 
approach of 4 different countries: 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain 
and Greece
The way each country responds to the socio-economic challenges, such as competitive pres-
sures, high unemployment, industrial restructuring, or simply globalisation, depends on a variety of 
inextricably linked socio-economic, political and cultural factors that need to be taken into account: 
the institutional context, the political and historic legacy, the structure of the economy, the labour 
market and welfare systems, and the absence or presence of a consensus culture are amongst the 
most prominent. This is also the case with the ﬂ  exicurity policy agenda that all EU countries have 
agreed to endorse.
Why is it that balanced trade-offs between business and labour are possible in some countries 
whilst not in others? What makes unions and labour accept wage restraint, or greater work ﬂ  exibility, 
with some form of compensation, whilst others refuse even to discuss the issue? Why do businesses 
in some national contexts behave responsibly, whilst in others not? Why is the state a credible and 
reliable interlocutor in particular countries and not in others? This is an example of the range of 
questions related to the ﬂ  exicurity agenda that need to be addressed by a comparative analysis of 
four EU countries with a distinct development path, or “variety of capitalism”: Denmark, the Neth-
erlands, Spain and Greece.
Comparative analyses are useful because they encourage a critical approach of what is considered 
as the norm or “conventional wisdom” and shed light on the huge diversity of factors at play, of 
possible pathways, and of national idiosyncrasies.Page ● 52
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6.1.    The socio-economic context
6.1.1.  Structure of the economy
A country’s ability to address the challenges of intensiﬁ  ed international competition and sustain 
or improve its competitive advantage in the world economy largely depends on the structural char-
acteristics of the economy.
Greece and Spain share a common historical legacy as semi-peripheral, late industrializing coun-
tries, ruled during long periods by an authoritarian central state, and characterized by a number of 
common structural weaknesses, such as:
a late de-ruralisation and tertiarisation of the economy;   ●
a not fully proletarianised manufacturing working class;   ●
a strong economic role of the family;   ●
high incidence of SMEs, of which a large number of family-run micro-ﬁ  rms;   ●
tolerance of tax evasion by SMEs   ●
traditional forms of work organization;    ● 29 
protected internal markets.   ●
After their accession to the EEC, however, Spain and Greece have followed a different develop-
mental path. In Greece, successive governments in the post-dictatorship era have opted for the low 
road to competitiveness, based on low-cost and low-quality products and services, rather than invest-
ing in the development of human capital and innovation capacity. This production “paradigm” has 
now reached its limits, as rising competition from countries with signiﬁ  cantly lower labour costs is 
driving out of business a growing number of ﬁ  rms, especially SMEs.30 What once was a comparative 
advantage (low labour costs / low wages), has now become a burden and a trap. 
29  Spain and Greece score the highest incidence amongst all EU countries of those working under taylorist or traditional 
forms of work organisation (European Commission, 2007). 
30  Average wages in Greece are still low compared to the EU-15 average, standing at about 68%, but they are consider-
ably higher than wages in the other Balkan and Eastern-European countries, not to mention the emerging econo-
mies. Page ● 53
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Although the Greek economy has made signiﬁ  cant progress following its accession to the EEC 
in 1981 and recorded high annual growth rates that ranged between 3%-5.5% (well above the EU av-
erage), it still suffers from a number of structural weaknesses such as: a government gross debt which 
reached 95% in 2007; soaring general government and current accounts deﬁ  cits (3.5% and 13.4% 
of GDP in 2007 respectively), low labour productivity -despite long working hours and low average 
wages-31, very low R&D spending (0.6% of GDP in 2005), constantly declining foreign investment, 
an ineffective and over-sized public sector, and high unemployment rates (7.7% in 2008). Not surpris-
ingly, the economy’s international competitiveness has been dramatically deteriorating over the past 
few years, reﬂ  ected in a steep fall from the 37th position in the world economy in 2004 to the 67th place 
in 2008. 32 The comparison with the other 26 EU countries is not any more encouraging, as Greece 
ranks in just the 23rd position among the EU countries regarding its overall performance.33 Moreover, 
the underground economy is still thriving, having been fuelled since the early 1990s by mass immigra-
tion ﬂ  ows, and is estimated to account for as much as 35% of GDP. The road to modernisation and 
the full convergence of Greece with the more developed EU countries is also seriously hampered by 
a deeply rooted system of political exchange and patronage, whose foundations have remained intact 
over the years, regardless of the political party that was in power. 
 
Spain also opted for the same low-road to competitiveness after the re-establishment of democ-
racy in the mid-1970s. But in the mid-1990s, the social actors realised that the declining international 
competitiveness of the Spanish economy and the dislocations generated by the European integration 
process made necessary a shift away from labour-intensive and low-qualiﬁ  ed production towards 
more capital-intensive industries, based on innovation, quality, value-added and productivity (Royo, 
2007). These developments triggered off a period of impressive economic performance, with high 
annual growth rates close to 4% of GDP, until the onset of the present global ﬁ  nancial and economic 
crisis. However, in many respects, long-standing structural weaknesses have not been successfully 
addressed: GDP growth is falling rapidly (whilst the EU forecast for 2009 is very bleak, -6.2%), un-
31  Greece has the highest annual contractual working time in the EU-27: 1820 hours, compared to 1760 in the EU-27 
and 1690 in the EU-15, as well as a lot of overtime work: 32% of employees work more than 48 hours/week (Kouzis, 
2008).
32  See the “Global Competitiveness Report” issued by the World Economic Forum in 2004 and 2008, and the respective 
GCI rankings. Available on line: www.weforum.org/gcr 
33  See the World Economic Forum Lisbon Review 2008. Available on: www.weforum.org/gcr Page ● 54
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employment levels are still very high and rising (8.3% in 2007, 11.3% in 2008, the highest in the EU), 
the current accounts deﬁ  cit is constantly growing (9.5% of GDP in 2008), labour productivity is low, 
inﬂ  ation rate is high and persistent, whilst household and business debt is soaring , R&D spending 
remains just above 1.1% of GDP (2005 ﬁ  gures), the productive sector is still largely dominated by 
traditionally low-tech, low value-added sectors and a large share of GDP growth is attributed to the 
volatile tourist industry and an over-sized construction sector. In Spain too, the Global Competitive-
ness Index (GCI) has fallen, though not as dramatically as in Greece, from the 23rd position in 2004 
to the 29th position in 2008.  
The Netherlands was successful in avoiding sliding from the core towards the semi-periphery in 
the 1970s largely through consensus based policy innovations, and by continually revising its model 
of liberal corporatism to create a new ‘Dutch Miracle’, albeit one largely based on wage ﬂ  exibility 
through atypical employment, particularly part-time work (Kleinknecht, 2002). At present, the Dutch 
economy has sound public ﬁ  nances with a budget as well as a current accounts surplus, high annual 
GDP growth rates until recently (3.5% in 2007 but estimated to slowdown in 2009), the lowest level 
of unemployment in the EU (2.6% in 2008), a low inﬂ  ation rate, R&D spending standing close to 
the EU average at 1.8% of GDP (2005), and an overall favourable business environment. As a result, 
it ranks amongst the strongest and more competitive economies, not only in Europe, but also in the 
world: the Netherlands rank in the 4th position among the EU-27 countries and in the 8th position in 
the Global Competitiveness Index in 2008 (an improvement of 4 positions as compared to 2004). 
However, the Dutch economy is being deeply affected by the current ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis. 
According to the latest Central Planning Bureau’s estimates, the prospects for 2009 and 2010 are 
bleak: unemployment is expected to rise to 5.5% in 2009 and 8.7% in 2010 (from a low 3.8% in 2008), 
whilst general government deﬁ  cit is expected to record a 5.6% deﬁ  cit by 2010 (from a 1% surplus in 
2008); accordingly, GDP growth rate will fall by 3.5% in 2009 and a further 0.25% in 2010.
Denmark is the best performing EU economy at the world scale, ranking in the 3rd position of 
the 2008 Global Competitiveness Index, just behind the USA and Switzerland. Its successful mac-
roeconomic record is illustrated by its budget and current accounts surpluses, very low unemploy-
ment levels that had fallen to a record low of 3.3% in 2008, low inﬂ  ation, an impressive rate of R&D Page ● 55
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spending (2.4% in 2005, 3rd highest in the EU), an attractive business environment, a well established 
knowledge society, and innovation performance well above the EU average. Furthermore, in contrast 
with the 3 other countries under consideration, Denmark’s non participation in the European Mon-
etary Unions increases the leverage of Danish authorities in domestic policy making.
Among the structural weaknesses facing the Spanish and the Greek economies, perhaps the one 
that is more relevant to understand the differences in labour market performance (as compared to 
Denmark and the Netherlands) and the fate of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda in the 2 Southern-European 
countries, is the high proportion of SMEs, especially of micro-ﬁ  rms, and their role in fostering or 
hampering the conditions for the successful implementation of workplace changes.
Share of micro-ﬁ  rms in the economy
Greece stands out amongst the EU countries in terms of the numerical predominance of SMEs 
in general and micro businesses in particular. 34 A notable number of them belong to the group 
of family-run enterprises and own-account workers (i.e. self-employed people without employees). 
There exist over 800 000 SMEs, which represent 97.5 % of all ﬁ  rms and 56.8 % of total employment 
in Greece.35 The overwhelming majority, over 90%, of these SMEs employ less than 10 employees. 
With 6 occupied persons per enterprise in 2005, the SMEs in Greece are far smaller on average than 
in the EU-15, with 6.9 persons per enterprise, or in Denmark with 7.9 persons.36 Overall, micro-ﬁ  rms 
account for 56.5% of non-ﬁ  nancial business economy employment in Greece, compared to 29.6% in 
the EU-27 (Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 31/2008 –ﬁ  gures refer to 2005). 
Spain’s economy also heavily relies on SMEs, particularly on micro-ﬁ  rms, with 40.8% of the 
workforce employed in ﬁ  rms with less than 10 employees37. Micro-ﬁ  rms contribute 39% of non-
ﬁ  nancial business economy employment38; 87.6% of SMEs employ between 1-9 employees39; almost 
34  Greece has one of the highest densities of SMEs per 1000 inhabitants in the EU-27: almost 75 ﬁ  rms, whilst Spain has 
less than 60, against less than 40 ﬁ  rms in the EU-27 on average (Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 31/2008 –ﬁ  gures refer to 
2005 and the non-ﬁ  nancial business economy).
35 The  comparable  ﬁ  gures for the EU-15 as a whole in 2003 were 92.4 % of all ﬁ  rms and 39.7 % of total employment 
(Mouriki & Traxler, 2007).
36  See Observatory of European SMEs Survey, 2007.
37  J.I. Anton’s analysis from the Observatory of European SMEs Survey, 2007.
38 Eurostat,  Statistics in Focus, 31/2008 –2005 ﬁ  gures. 
39  Observatory of European SMEs Survey, 2007Page ● 56
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8 out of 10 Spanish ﬁ  rms have less than three employees and more than half have no employees at 
all. Most SMEs operate in the service and commerce sectors, where the level of unionization is low. 
This leads to an individualization of labour relations, thus providing ﬁ  rms with increased ﬂ  exibility 
in the organisation of work (Royo, 2007).
The prevalence of SMEs, and in particular of micro-ﬁ  rms, in Greece and Spain, can provide an 
explanation as to why the business sector in these two countries has not been able to play a leading 
role in the shaping of the national growth model and in facilitating change and policy innovation (act-
ing as “institutional entrepreneurs”). SMEs are especially burdened with economic backwardness and 
have a very poor record of regulation enforcement and a widespread recourse to informal employ-
ment. At the same time, they lack the human and technical resources that would allow them to reap 
the full beneﬁ  ts of the programmes directed to them through the Community Support Frameworks 
and to adjust to the new environment and challenges ahead (Mouriki & Traxler, 2007).
In addition, owing to their size SMEs, and micro-ﬁ  rms in particular: 
are unable to take advantage of economies of scale;   ●
apply traditional forms of work organisation and their innovation capacity is low;   ●
have limited access to public resources and bank loans and are the ﬁ  rst victims of tight-   ●
ening credit conditions;
suffer disproportionably from excessive administrative regulations;   ●
make little use of Information and Communication Technologies and modern manage-   ●
ment techniques;
face difﬁ  culties in recruiting skilled labour;   ●
lack resources to train their employees, and do not have an incentive to do so in the ﬁ  rst    ●
place;
do not have a valid interlocutor from the workers’ side, as unionisation is either very    ●
weak or non-existent in small ﬁ  rms;
their competitive advantage is often based on low costs and weak institutional regulation.   ●
By contrast, in Denmark and the Netherlands, ﬁ  rms have been central actors in the national de-
velopmental path and participate in the design and implementation of policies. The more a ﬁ  rm is Page ● 57
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embedded within this national developmental path, institutions and culture, the more likely it is to 
coordinate its corporate strategy to the interests of other actors in the national society, particularly to 
balance the ﬁ  rm’s ‘economic’ interest with societal interests such as cohesion and equality (European 
Commission, 2005).  Moreover, in these two countries, even SMEs (on average larger than in the 
Southern European countries) are willing to address the challenges of intensiﬁ  ed competition and 
technological change by pursuing organisational changes and becoming “learning organisations”. 
Although Denmark’s industrial structure is dominated by SMEs, about half of the organisations 
analysed in a 2001 survey had carried out organisational changes, whilst 2 out of 3 employees in Den-
mark and the Netherlands were found (in a 2000 EU comparative study) to be employed by “learning 
organisations”, well above the EU average of 39% (mentioned in Bredgaard et al., 2005).
6.1.2.  Welfare regimes
As we have seen in section 3.3., the 4 countries under consideration fall into different welfare 
regimes that affect their level of social protection (see Box below). Denmark and the Netherlands, 
although belonging to a different welfare regime, are regarded as models of how labour markets 
can perform successfully without compromising social protection. 40 In Denmark, in particular, the 
authorities had realized early that a high level of social security is the pre-condition for a ﬂ  exible 
labour market and that any cuts in welfare spending would eventually lead to a reduction in labour 
market ﬂ  exibility. By contrast, Spain and Greece, both typical examples of the Southern European 
welfare model, are an illustration of poor labour market performance and residual social protection 
systems.
40  Although, as Visser (2005) points out, the high disablement rate (12% of the labour force in 2000) remains a sour spot 
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Country Type of welfare regime
Level and form of social 
protection of the unemployed
Denmark inclusive regime(social 
democratic)
high degree of institutionalized 
protection
  The Netherlands continental (corporatist) regime insurance- based, employment-
centered protection  
   Spain
   
   Greece
Southern European welfare 
regime 1
sub-protective (importance of 
family and informal networks)
Despite some major changes in the welfare regimes over the past 20 years and successive institu-
tional reforms, Spain and Greece still retain some of the traditional features of the Southern European 
welfare regime, such as:
under-ﬁ  nanced and ineffective social services (total  social expenditure in Greece had    ●
reached its highest level, 26% of GDP in 2004, as compared to Spain, where it remained 
at 20% of GDP);
the residual and fragmented character of the social protection systems, covering only    ●
those with a full-time and uninterrupted career;
clientelism and patronage networks that distribute social beneﬁ  ts to favoured groups, cre-   ●
ating a polarization between the more and the less privileged segments of the population;
the central role of the family in providing care and support to its vulnerable members. In    ●
addition to its traditional functions, the family has additionally become the main ‘shock 
absorber’ against high youth unemployment and a protracted school-to-work and youth-
to-adulthood transition (Karamessini, 2008a); 41
the persistence of the male breadwinner model, despite its gradual erosion resulting from    ●
the growth of the dual-earner model. As a result, social security systems continue to be 
organized around the concept of derived rights (male breadwinner/female carer). Ad-
ditionally, the male bread-winner continues to enjoy high levels of job security, owing to 
the urgency of safeguarding the earnings and the career of the sole family bread-winner 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999);
41  Unlike Northern Europe, in the Southern Europe, young adults leave their parental home at marriage and continue 
to receive family support during their adult life in many areas (housing, childcare, daily chores, unforeseen expenses, 
etc.). Page ● 59
Flexibility and security: an asymmetrical relationship?
high continuity in female employment patterns, reﬂ  ecting the absence of safe labour    ●
market transitions; 
low unemployment compensation and coverage;    ● 42
poorly developed family and work-life balance policies: existing policy measures and    ●
programmes fall short of effectively addressing the problems that arise from the conﬂ  ict-
ing and complex roles of both women and men. As a result, individuals have to invent 
their own, often informal or costly arrangements that will allow them to strike a balance 
between work and private life. This is becoming increasingly difﬁ  cult in a context of high 
levels of unemployment and job insecurity, of institutional rigidities, and of traditional 
social perceptions and attitudes.43
The residual protection provided by the welfare system in Greece is being further accentuated 
by the fact that so far, no minimum income guarantee scheme has been introduced, to alleviate the 
impact of social inequalities44, whilst in Spain it has been introduced by the regional governments. As 
a result, the percentage of the population in both Spain and Greece that is at-risk-of-poverty, even 
after social transfers, is amongst the highest in EU-25, standing at 20% (see table 4).
Table 4: At-risk-of-poverty rate (% of total population) - 2005
DK NL SP GR EU-25
before social transfers 30 22 24 23 26
after social transfers 12 11 20 20 16
employed  •  5 9 10 13 8
unemployed •  26 27 35 32 40
retired •  16 5 25 25 16
Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2008, Europe in ﬁ  gures, Living conditions and welfare
42  Owing to the very low unemployment compensation rates and the short duration of beneﬁ  ts in   Greece, the family 
has to step in and support its most vulnerable members. In Spain the duration of the unemployment beneﬁ  ts is longer 
and the categories of potential recipients broader.
43  In Greece, despite the inadequacy of childcare and elderly-care infrastructure and the rigidity of working time pat-
terns, the issue of reconciling work with family life is very low on the political agenda. Moreover, there is a striking 
lack of demand or interest on behalf of unions, but also of employees, for family-friendly policies. This paradox may 
be explained by the fact that female participation rate is still very low in Greece, whilst informal support networks 
(traditional family), although diminishing in importance, still cover, to a large degree, childcare needs.
44  Not surprisingly, Greece stands out amongst most EU-27 countries for its economic inequalities, as the income of the 
20% wealthier segment of the population (owing 40.4% of total income) is 6 times the income of the poorest 20% 
of the population,  that only owes 7% of total income (see INE/GSEE, 2008).Page ● 60
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We observe that in Spain and Greece, social transfers, although a signiﬁ  cant and growing share 
of GDP at least in Greece, have a very limited effect in reducing the share of the population that is 
at-risk-of-poverty, as opposed to Denmark and the Netherlands, where social transfers seem to be 
very effective in bringing down the risk rate. Even employed persons run more than twice as greater 
risk of being poor in Greece and Spain than in Denmark, suggesting a larger incidence of working 
poor in these two countries, but also in the Netherlands.
6.1.3. Education and skills
Ongoing education and training is considered as key for the success of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda, 
as it enhances the employability and adaptability of the workforce and provides individuals with the 
necessary skills that will allow them to respond to rapid technological change. The differences in the 
level but also the effectiveness of spending on education and training across the 4 countries under 
consideration are very eloquent.
In Greece, despite a rise in formal education, the expenditure rate remains one of the lowest 
among the OECD countries, barely 3.4% of GDP (2004 comparative ﬁ  gures), as compared to 7.2% 
in Denmark, 5.1% in the Netherlands, 4.7% in Spain and 5.8% in the OECD-average (see OECD, 
Education at a glance, 2007). Even more pronounced is the low level of spending on vocational training 
and lifelong learning that continue to absorb very limited funds and demonstrate a low effectiveness 
compared to other EU member states.  High enrolment rates in upper secondary and tertiary educa-
tion indicate a drive towards formal education and a narrowing of the gap with the more developed 
OECD countries. In 2005, the share of the population aged 20-24 years having completed at least 
upper secondary education was 84%, as opposed to 74.5% in the EU-15, whilst in Spain, the rate was 
below the EU-15 average. The enrolment rate in tertiary education of young people aged 20 years in 
2004 was as high as 60.2% in Greece, against 37.7% in Spain and 33.1% in the EU-15. However, the 
completion rate was much lower in Greece than in Spain. Overall, Spain possesses a higher share of 
high educated working-age population compared to Greece and has developed an important pool of 
highly educated population of working age. On the other hand, in Spain, the early school leaving rate 
is 31%, the third highest in the EU, and conceals considerable regional variations. Greece, by con-Page ● 61
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trast, appears to have opted for a cheap mass tertiary education, characterised by the steady growth 
of enrolments and the decreasing expenditure per student (Karamessini, 2008b). Despite high youth 
educational attainment, the youth unemployment rate in Greece remains 3 times higher than the EU 
average.
Participation in lifelong learning programmes has grown over the past years in Spain, but has 
remained extremely low in Greece. The creation of paths between the education and the training 
systems and the links between initial and continuing training have been established in both Spain 
and Greece since the early 1990s. Yet the participation of the adult population in lifelong learning 
programmes has remained in both countries much lower than in the EU-15, particularly so in Greece, 
where it stood at just 2.1% of the population in 2007, as compared to 10.4% in Spain, 16.6% in the 
Netherlands and an impressive 29.2% in Denmark (Eurostat, 2007).  The lack of training oppor-
tunities for adults and the absence of a system of ofﬁ  cial recognition of non-formal and informal 
learning constitute the main shortcomings of a fragmented approach to the education and training 
systems in Greece, as well as a most ineffective use of the generous EU funds directed to this goal.
In Denmark, the upper secondary completion rate stands at 81% for the adult population aged 
25-64 and 87% for the younger cohorts aged 25-34 (OECD, Education at a glance, 2007), slightly below 
the EU average and national targets for 2010 and 2015 (85% by 2010, 95% by 2015). The share of 
the adult population (aged between 25-64) having completed tertiary education is also one of the 
highest in the OECD and stood at 34% in 2005 (ibid.)According to the recent EU Annual Progress 
Report, however, high spending on education does not appear to yield the level of results that would 
be expected; efforts are still needed to bridge the gap to the national target for tertiary youth comple-
tion rate of 50% and take measures to enhance the quality of labour supply in the future. Even so, 
it remains that the Danish public training and education system is one of the most comprehensive 
in Europe and thus is able to correct –as it has been argued- the “market failure” resulting from the 
high mobility rate of the workforce (Bredgaard et al., 2005).
In the Netherlands, the rate of adult population having completed upper secondary education in 
2005 was 72% and that of the younger cohorts aged 25-34 was 81% (OECD, 2007), still below the 
EU target of 85% by 2010. The percentage of adults aged 25-64 having completed tertiary education 
stood at 30% in 2005, slightly above Spain (ibid.) However, one of the major challenges facing the Page ● 62
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Dutch educational system that needs to be addressed is the poor achievement levels of children from 
disadvantaged groups and a migrant background. 
6.2.  The process of social concertation
Governments are believed to engage in corporatist policy concertation primarily when they are 
in a situation of weakness and need to reinforce their legitimacy in view of carrying out painful re-
forms that are likely to arouse signiﬁ  cant opposition (e.g. labour market and welfare reform). What 
is sought in this process is support and consent on behalf of social actors that enjoy a veto power 
(Afonso, 2009). 
“When the state shares pubic space, it usually lacks the legitimacy, competencies, and im-
plementation capacity to single-handedly carry out desired reforms of  social and employ-
ment policy. Therefore, formal or informal forums for tripartite social dialogue between the 
government and the social partners facilitate their developing a shared understanding of  the 
problems, as they discuss policy alternatives and their implications, and reach compromises on 
a common purpose” (Ebbinghaus 2005, mentioned in Afonso 2009). 
As many scholars have observed and the European Commission pointed out, one of the funda-
mental requirements for the implementation and success of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda is a supportive and 
productive social dialogue between the social partners and public authorities. This vital prerequisite 
–of fundamental importance in view of generating sufﬁ  cient support to pursue far reaching and 
controversial reforms- raises doubt as to the transferability of the model to countries where social 
partnership is not ﬁ  rmly established and levels of social trust are low.  
It appears that the strong and long-standing presence of a consensus culture in the Netherlands 
and Denmark has played a most signiﬁ  cant role in the successful economic and labour market per-
formance in these countries, as opposed to both Spain and Greece, where “consensus” was estab-
lished at a much later stage and under the increasing pressure of the European integration process. Page ● 63
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45 The Dutch and Danish experience suggests that behaviours, routines and informal rules can be 
equally if not more consequential than detailed regulations. On the other hand, a long tradition of 
social consultation and consensus building does not always guarantee a balanced and fair deal for the 
partners involved in the process of social consultation.
The Dutch growth model, in particular, has heavily relied both on the consensus culture (‘overleg’) 
based on high levels of trust between social actors, as well as on a corporatist system of labour rela-
tions that favoured social peace. The two main institutions of social consultation that have always 
played a crucial role in the formulation of policy are the bi-partite Foundation for Labour (StAr) and 
the tri-partite Socio-economic Coun  cil (SER). The Foundation is the main seat for the preparation 
of joint opinions and central agreements, whilst the role of SER is to produce advice on social and 
economic legislation and supervise works councils (Visser, 2005). 
An outstanding example of the success of this consensus culture is the Wassenaar Agreement. In 
the early 1980s, the Netherlands was suffering from a longer and steeper recession than most other 
countries, and its budget deﬁ  cit and unemployment rate were high. Trade unions were convinced that 
sacriﬁ  cing wage increases would enhance the international competitiveness of the Dutch economy 
and thus lead to job creation and employment security. The weak position of unions and their aware-
ness of the gravity of the situation made them adopt a realistic attitude which led to the conclusion 
in 1982 of the bipartite Wassenaar Agreement between the unions and employers’ organisations. This 
Agreement, unique in many senses, stipulated wage moderation in exchange for a working time 
reduction and greater labour market ﬂ  exibility. As Visser and Hemerijk have pointed out: “the net 
result of  Wassenaar was a change in the relationship between government and the social partners from conﬂ ictual, 
self-interested bargaining to a more consensual atmosphere in which it was possible to develop a common policy agenda” 
(Visser & Hemerijk, 1997, in Bruff, 2008b). 46
45  According to Bruff (2008a) and the neo-Gramscian perspective, the presence or absence of a consensus culture in 
any given country depends on the potential for synthesis between different versions of common sense, whilst from 
the ‘variety of capitalism’ perspective it depends rather on social  learning and path-dependency. 
46  The outcome of the Wassenaar Agreement was less clear, however, in terms of economic performance. Undoubtedly, 
wage moderation and ﬂ  exibilisation of labour relations did indeed lead to a job-intensive growth and full employment. 
The Netherlands experienced the most impressive employment growth among all EU countries during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. But wage moderation also led to low productivity growth, a decline in the speed of technological progress 
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Some scholars argue that this “consensus by reluctant acquiescence rather than consensus by 
positive agreement” has been possible because the social partners share a common awareness of the 
vulnerability of the Dutch economy, and because wage moderation enjoys a “remarkable” legitimacy 
in the Netherlands, unlike any other country (Bruff, 2008b). 
Following the Wassenaar Agreement, two major tripartite central agreements concluded in the 
1990s, were the New Course agreement of 1993 on working time reduction, and the Flexibility and Se-
curity agreement of 1996 (Visser, 2005). The rapid deterioration of the economy and growing social 
unrest indicated at the beginning of the 2000s that the era of consensus was over. This period, how-
ever, only lasted until 2004, when consensus was once again re-established, although this time heavily 
skewed against labour. Unions agreed to a wage freeze, in return for fewer cuts in welfare spending 
that the government had unilaterally planned –without consulting the social partners. On this occa-
sion, Bruff (2008a) makes the point that the exchange of concessions was even more asymmetric 
than in the 1980s and 1990s, although it came from the state and not from the employers.
In Denmark centralised negotiations and dispute solving mechanisms were established long be-
fore most other European countries. As early as 1899, the labour market parties had reached an 
agreement on how to regulate labour market issues without state interference (Larsen, 2004).47 Public 
authorities assumed a more active role in the formulation of labour market policies only after the 
1960s. Social partners have always been and continue to be an important driving force behind the 
developments in labour market policy through their institutionalised participation not only in the 
making and implementation of policy, but also in administration, through their representation in 
councils, committees, commissions and regional bodies with increased competences (ibid.). The long 
tradition of consensus-creating institutions and the prominent role of the social partners allow room 
for broad compromises when far reaching reforms are needed. By contrast, the parliamentary system 
and government coalitions traditionally have little inﬂ  uence on labour market policy formulation.
According to Larsen (2004), Denmark’s successful labour market performance is hard to explain 
rationally and on the basis of conscious and deliberate policies, as it is strongly based on practical 
experience and the institutional setting that mitigates the power struggles between the social actors. 
47  The so-called “September Compromise” of 1899 also recognised the employers’ right to hire and ﬁ  re at will (Bredgaard, 
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A basic ingredient of its success is the long-established acknowledgment, which nobody really ques-
tions, that labour market policy includes both economic and welfare political goals, and that these 
goals are not mutually exclusive; thus ‘workfare’ and ‘welfare’ elements have always been comple-
mentary to each other (ibid.). Understanding the peculiar way of balancing these economic and social 
considerations can provide a useful insight in explaining the Danish success. A lot of measures were 
able to go through because the actors involved could always count on the rationality of the opposite 
parties and the collectivist culture embedded in society (ibid.).
Overtime, Danish businesses and unions alike have been strongly opposed to any government 
initiatives to introduce changes in the balance achieved between ﬂ  exibility and security. However, the 
consultative role of the social partners has been diminishing in recent years, whilst central administra-
tion is regaining power. Similarly, the disciplining elements of labour market policies and economic 
considerations have been gaining a more prominent position at the expense of welfare and social 
integration considerations. However, the institutional framework seems to be able to secure a certain 
balancing of the two dimensions (ibid). 
Spain developed its coordination mechanisms only recently. The strong state involvement in shap-
ing industrial relations, divided unions with weak collective bargaining capacity and low membership, 
and the absence of a consensus culture have delayed the emergence of a process of tripartite regula-
tion of the labour market and welfare systems. As Royo (2007) points out, it was the relative failure of 
government imposed labour market reforms in the second half of the 1980s and the ﬁ  rst half of the 
1990s, and continuous confrontations with the unions demanding higher wages, that convinced Span-
ish employers to develop a partnership approach with unions in order to address these shortcomings. 
This increased cooperation among the social actors was also the result of a change in attitudes of 
Spanish employers, who realised that, in order to adjust more ﬂ  exibly to changing market conditions 
and address the challenges of European integration, they needed the cooperation of workers and 
unions in establishing social peace. They thus became willing to accept greater employment stability 
in return for wage moderation and more internal ﬂ  exibility at the workplace.  Unions, on their part, 
weakened by the collapse of social bargaining in 1986, were eager to extend their inﬂ  uence beyond 
their shrinking core constituency and regain their capacity to inﬂ  uence policy making (ibid.).Page ● 66
Aliki Mouriki
During the 1990s, tripartite collective bargaining produced as many as 25 agreements between 
the social partners, covering a wide range of issues, from wage moderation, to internal and external 
ﬂ  exibility and welfare reforms. However, according to Royo (2007), while contractual and legislative 
changes provided greater ﬂ  exibility to employers and weakened labour, they have not led to a deregu-
lation of the industrial relations system, as unions managed to exploit international constraints and 
the ﬁ  rms’ determination to avoid conﬂ  ictual relations with labour, so as to retain their position in 
the concertation process. This trend towards greater coordination and centralisation (despite union 
fragmentation and the absence of a centralised wage setting system) point to a distinct form of neo-
corporatism, ‘competitive corporatism’48, characterised by pacts among weaker organisations with 
governments acting as the instigator. 
Greece, despite the transformation process triggered off in the 1980s when the socialists came 
into power, has been unable to establish fully functioning consensus institutions that would facilitate 
the synthesis of different and often opposing views and thus allow national policies to successfully 
adjust to the country’s external environment. Deeply entrenched political exchange relationships with 
the state, internal fragmentation and conﬂ  ict of interests within both organised business associations 
and trade unions, makes them hesitant to fully engage in the social dialogue process and develop a 
common approach. 
Business interest associations in Greece are still differentiated not only according to the type of 
business activity and the size of ﬁ  rms, but also along political party afﬁ  liations. The participation 
of Greek business interest associations in the European institutions, however, has reinforced their 
bargaining power and autonomy vis-à-vis the Greek state, whilst it opened up new opportunities 
for domestic action, through their institutionalized access to public policy within the framework of 
corporatist bodies.49 As for unions, they are primarily plagued by political cleavages and antagonisms. 
Despite the introduction of social dialogue institutions and other initiatives since the early 1990s, the 
politicisation of unions and their reliance on state intervention and political exchange have not in the 
least weakened over the years. This politicisation, compounded by antagonism between factions and 
the lack of political consensus over reforms, undermines social concertation (Zambarloukou, 2006) 
48  This term is used by Rhodes, 1998 mentioned in Royo, 2007.
49  This rise of organized business in Greece has been described as an “artiﬁ  cial neo-corporatism”, owing to the fact that 
it was not caused by a genuine, endogenous development, but rather by a bottom-down process, unleashed by the 
growing requirements for macro governance in the wake of European integration (Aranitou, 2002). Page ● 67
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and the establishment of a common ground, even on issues whose urgency is undisputable like the 
reform of the social security and pension systems, or labour market reforms. The only exception 
was the period before the accession of Greece to the European Monetary Union when the need to 
comply with the formal criteria for joining the euro-zone gathered support from a wide spectrum of 
political and social forces, including the trade unions that had accepted a wage freeze in order to ease 
the transition pains. Most of the time, reform attempts are blocked by some key interest groups who 
take advantage of their position in the institutional environment to prevent any (real or presumed) 
attack on their vested interests. 
The inability of the social partners to articulate a coherent and sustainable common policy agen-
da –despite their formal participation in a signiﬁ  cant number of corporatist institutions responsible 
for public policy design 50- leads into unilateral, and hence ineffective, legislative initiatives by the state 
authorities. This is because the inﬂ  uence of the social partners in policy formulation and implementa-
tion is formalistic rather than substantial, whilst the government tends to oscillate between involve-
ment of the social partners and unilateral decisions. The lack of central direction and continuity 
allows the social partners to absolve themselves from the responsibility of constructing a consensus 
on labour market and welfare reforms (Ioannou 2000a).  This incapacity to arrive at a compromise 
on almost any issue that requires a trade-off is simply a reﬂ  ection of the historic failure of the central 
authority in Greece to act as a coordinating force between the various interest groups and to impose 
the public interest on private or narrow corporatist interests.
6.3.   Labour market systems
Labour market institutions and performance vary considerably across the four countries under 
consideration. Denmark and the Netherlands have amongst the most ﬂ  exible labour markets in the 
EU, as well as generous unemployment beneﬁ  ts and effective active labour market policies; whilst 
Spain and Greece, at the other end of the spectrum, retain the characteristics of traditional and 
segmented labour markets, with low unemployment insurance and limited spending on active labour 
market policies.
50  The social partners’ peak organisations - GSEE for labour and SEV, GSEVEE, and ESEE on behalf of business- 
have the capacity to nominate their representatives in a wide array of public institutions, decision-making bodies, 
ministerial committees, steering committees, monitoring committees of EU funded programs, etc. Page ● 68
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6.3.1.   Prevailing labour market characteristics
Employment structure
As stated earlier, the male breadwinner model is still resisting in Greece and Spain, despite the 
steady growth of female employment rates, albeit from very low levels until the late 1990s. As low 
average wages in these countries 51 cannot guarantee a family wage, women tend to seek full time 
employment, in order to ensure a better income. Thus the incidence of part-time work in these two 
countries is much lower than the EU average.52 However, Spain has the largest share of workers 
employed on ﬁ  xed-term contracts in the EU-27 (34%), whilst Greece can “boost” of its impressive 
number of undeclared workers (estimated at around 20% of the workforce). Precarious forms of 
employment are also growing rapidly. In Greece, in the period 2003-2006, pseudo-independent con-
tract work, also known as “bogus self-employment” increased by 77%, and interim work by 27% in 
only one year, whilst around 70% of the total increase in employment is attributed to ﬂ  exible work-
ing patterns (Labour Inspectorate Annual Report, 2007). Self-employment is also very widespread in 
Greece, accounting for 40.7 % of total employment, as compared to the EU-27 average of 16.6 % 
(Employment in Europe 2008). 
The Netherlands, often admired for its ‘employment miracle’, owes its impressive track record 
of job creation (four times larger than the EU average) mostly to the rapid expansion of part-time 
employment over the past 30 years, a development that ranks it in the ﬁ  rst place amongst all EU-27 
countries and justiﬁ  es its name as ‘the ﬁ  rst part-time economy in the world’ (Visser, 2002). According 
to Tijdens (2005), 3 factors have played a major role in this spectacular growth in part-time employ-
ment:  
the employees have the right to adjust working hours to their needs: since 2000, workers in  a) 
ﬁ  rms with 10 or more employees have the right to adjust their working hours by 20%;
this adjustment can take place within one’s job, so there is no need to seek for another job;  b) 
the marginalisation of part-time work has been avoided by removing all discriminatory   c) 
 clauses on working hours53
51  Average annual wages in Greece and Spain were only 25 934 USD and 27 735 USD respectively in 2006, whilst in the 
Netherlands the average wage was 45 337 USD and in Denmark 56 598 USD, more than double than in the former 
countries (OECD Employment Outlook, 2008).
52  The remuneration of part-time jobs in Greece is even lower than the unemployment beneﬁ  t which currently stands 
at € 430,75 per month.
53  An illustration of this non-marginalisation is the fact that 2 out of 5 women working part-time are in managerial, 
professional or technical work (Visser, 2002).Page ● 69
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Visser (2002) attributes the expansion of part-time work, particularly amongst married women 
with children, also to particular institutional and normative changes, such as the changes of attitudes 
towards work, motherhood and childrearing; the introduction of equal pay legislation; tax reform 
that made female employment worthwhile; and the endorsement of work sharing policies by unions 
as well as by employers. Part-time jobs have thus become the main entry point into paid employment 
for young people and a transitional arrangement between domestic activities and employment, mostly 
for women (Visser, 2005). The fact that only a minority of Dutch women prefer to work full time 
54, especially during the childrearing years, has led to the “one-and-a-half-job-per-household” model, 
unique in Europe (ibid.). Although part-time jobs are neither atypical nor ﬂ  exible (81% of part-time 
jobs are standard jobs on indeﬁ  nite duration contracts, subject to full dismissal protection), they have 
increased the aggregate ﬂ  exibility of the Dutch economy (Visser, 2002). Other forms of ﬂ  exible em-
ployment are also widespread: temporary agency work (quite common among ﬁ  rst time job seekers), 
ﬁ  xed-term contracts, on-call work, ﬂ  exi-time, new forms of self-employment (subcontracting), etc.
 In Denmark, the EU country with the highest female participation rate, the only ﬂ  exible form 
of employment that is widely practiced and is above the EU-27 average is part-time work, which ac-
counts for 23.6% of total employment (still, only half the rate of the Netherlands). All other ﬂ  exible 
or atypical forms of employment are rather rare, indicating that the Danish employers enjoy a more 
than satisfactory level of ﬂ  exibility, not so much through ﬂ  exible employment patterns, as through 
very high levels of numerical ﬂ  exibility and labour mobility, the result of low-cost and uncomplicated 
hiring and ﬁ  ring procedures (backed by a generous state support system). As Bredgaard et al. (2005) 
observe, 25%-30% of the Danish workforce change employers every year. 55 Additionally, the Danish 
workforce is highly salaried (93.7%, as compared to just 59.3% in Greece) and thus subject to rights 
and obligations.
54  The incidence of full time employment amongst women is the lowest in Europe, 18%, as compared to 45% in Den-
mark (Visser, 2002).
55  It is estimated that owing to this great labour mobility, between a third and a quarter of the workforce is affected by 
– a usually short spell of- unemployment in a year (Bredgaard et al., 2005).Page ● 70
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Table 5: Key employment indicators - 2006 (%)
EU-27 EU-15 DK NL SP GR
full time equivalent empl. 58.9 58.4 69.0 57.3 60.8 59.3
female employment rate 57.1 58.4 73.4 67.7 53.2 47.4
part-time employment 18.1 20.8 23.6 46.2 12.0 5.7
ﬁ  xed-term contracts 14.4 14.7 8.9 16.6 34.0 10.7
self-employed 16.6 14.6 6.3 13.9 14.5 40.7
employment in agriculture 6.4 3.7 3.0 3.1 5.0 14.4*
employment in services 68.6 72.6 76.1 79.8 65.4 62.7*
unemployment rate 7.9 7.4 3.9 3.9 8.6 8.9
youth unemployment •  17.5 16.2 7.7 6.6 18.0 25.2
female unemployment •  8.8 8.4 4.5 4.4 11.6 13.6
long term unemploym. •  3.6 3.1 0.8 1.7 1.9 4.8
Source: Employment in Europe, 2008
* 2005 ﬁ  gures
Employment Protection Legislation
A highly controversial issue in the literature is to what extent a high degree of employment 
protection is associated with poor labour market performance, reﬂ  ected in increased levels of un-
employment, low labour mobility and costly hiring and ﬁ  ring procedures. Or, inversely, whether 
employment protection is associated with increased labour productivity, greater loyalty of the em-
ployees and a higher propensity of ﬁ  rms to invest in training. Less contested, however, is the impact 
of strict employment legislation on the margins of the workforce and the strengthening of divisions 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. As the empirical evidence suggests, in the majority of European 
countries, reductions in the strictness of Employment Protection Legislation are usually conﬁ  ned to 
the peripheral workforce and very rarely affect regular workers. 56 De-regulation at the margins of the 
labour market increases labour market segmentation, as atypical workers have to carry a dispropor-
tionate share of the burden of economic adjustment, thus leading to more precarious employment 
(Viebrock & Clasen, 2009).
Despite successive legislative initiatives since the mid-1990s, Greece and Spain continue to have 
the most restrictive EPL in the OECD. In Greece, however, labour market rigidity has watered down 
signiﬁ  cantly following a series of legislative initiatives during the period 1990-2005, that introduced 
a number of ﬂ  exible working arrangements (part-time work, telework, interim work, annualisation 
56  See Boeri T., Conde-Ruiz, J. I. & V. Galasso, 2003, “Protecting against labour market risk: employment protection or 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts?” CEPR Discussion Paper, no.3990, mentioned in Viebrock & Clasen, 2009.Page ● 71
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of working time, temporary agency work, etc.), as well as a relaxation of collective dismissals proce-
dures, especially in ﬁ  rms with less than 50 employees. Limited labour mobility, both occupational and 
geographical, high ﬁ  ring costs for white-collar workers and the minimum wage provision for newly 
recruits constitute the main rigidities that persist in the formal labour market.
However, the persisting relative strictness of EPL in Spain and Greece, does not mean that em-
ployers do not still enjoy signiﬁ  cant margins of employment ﬂ  exibility allowing them to minimize 
non-wage labour costs (social security contributions, severance pay, annual leave, social beneﬁ  ts, etc.), 
by having recourse to atypical, irregular and even undeclared forms of work (see below, degree of 
enforcement of regulations). Moreover, in these 2 countries, relatively strict EPL is associated with 
low labour market spending, suggesting a trade-off between income and employment security. 
In the Netherlands and Denmark, increasing labour market deregulation and low employment 
protection even for permanent employees (in the case of Denmark), have been offset by providing 
a comprehensive safety net to the unemployed through the welfare institutions (especially through 
unemployment insurance).
A common practice to circumvent restrictive EPL is to introduce new legislation “on top” of the 
pre-existing one that allows a wider recourse to certain forms of ﬂ  exible labour –such as ﬁ  xed-term 
contracts, temporary agency work, bogus self-employment, on-call work, zero-hours contracts, etc. 
This practice is known as “institutional  layering”, a concept used by Streek and Thelen in their typol-
ogy of incremental institutional change.57
A meaningful discussion of the appropriateness of the EPL index as a measure of labour market 
efﬁ  ciency should, however, take into account the fact that indicators used by OECD and other inter-
national organisations are exclusively based on the prevailing rules and decrees and do not take into 
account their enforcement and what actually happens at the workplace and in the real economy. 
 
57  Streeck, W. & K. Thelen, 2005, Beyond continuity: institutional change in advanced political economies, Oxford University Press. 
Mentioned in Houwing (2009).Page ● 72
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Degree of enforcement of regulations
The enforcement of regulations and of labour and social security legislation in particular, is not an 
issue in countries with strong monitoring and sanction mechanisms and a quasi non-existent informal 
sector, like Denmark and the Netherlands. By contrast, in Southern Europe, very often a rigid and 
complicated regulatory framework goes hand-in-hand with widespread violation of legislation and 
an extensive underground economy. Greece, is the country with the highest incidence of violation of 
employment rights in the EU (Kouzis, 2008), as the beneﬁ  ts of violation still seem to outweigh the 
cost of sanctions imposed. Attempts to contain the expansion of the underground economy have 
repeatedly proved unsuccessful as the informal sector is constantly boosted by the massive inﬂ  ux 
of often undocumented migrant workers and the labour reserve of unemployed women and youth, 
that together constitute a vast pool of undeclared and cheap labour. Although hard to measure, un-
declared work is estimated at about 25% of the total workforce and accounts for about 20% of the 
national GDP (see INE/GSEE 2007 Annual Report). The non-enforcement of regulations is not the 
privileged ground only of the informal sector of the economy. Within the formal labour market too, 
organisations and ﬁ  rms often have recourse to a series of practices that violate the labour and social 
security legislation. The most widespread illegal or “irregular” practices include: undeclared and/or 
unpaid overtime work; minimum or partial social insurance of the workforce; non payment of a part 
of the wage an employee is entitled to; non payment of social beneﬁ  ts; the absence of an individual 
employment contract or the coercive signing of resignation on behalf of an employee working with 
an individual contract; the transformation of a full time contract into a part-time one, against the will 
of the employee; the illegal and unpaid extension of the part-timers’ working hours schedule, etc.58 
It is hard to say whether it is the relative rigidity of formal rules until recently that encouraged the 
Greek entrepreneurs, in particular SMEs owners, to operate partly or totally informally, or whether 
this entrepreneurial attitude is the result of the low road to competitiveness adopted in Greece and 
the prevailing “culture of convenience”. In any event, the weakness of the inspection mechanisms to 
monitor the enforcement of regulations and the rarity of sanctions imposed, 59  but also the fear of 
58  See the annual reports published by the Labour Inspectorate, Ministry of Employment and Social Security.
59  There are 647 social inspectors employed at the Labour Inspectorate in charge of controlling 844 103 ﬁ  rms. In 2007, 
they carried out 35805 controls and imposed sanctions in 7850 cases. The other inspection mechanisms (the Social 
Insurance Foundation and the tax authorities) are also vastly ineffective and capture only a small fraction of viola-
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the precarious workers to denounce their employers, encourage a signiﬁ  cant number of compa-
nies and organisations, even large ones, to systematically use the violation of legislation as a way of 
cutting labour costs and staying in business.  
Active labour market policies
As we have seen in section 3.2. (Table 3), Greece has the least developed active labour market 
policies in the EU-15, with Spain doing better than all the other Southern European countries, whilst 
Denmark is the EU champion in both active and passive labour market spending and the Netherlands 
rank at the 2nd position regarding active measures and total expenditure. Overall, total public expendi-
ture on labour market policies in Denmark is twice as big as in Spain and more than 7 times as big as 
in Greece, pointing to one of the most consequential underlying factors for the huge differences in 
the enforcement of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda amongst these countries.
Table 6
















* ﬁ  gures for Greece do not include Public Employment Services and administration costs
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2006, Statistical AnnexPage ● 74
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Unemployment insurance
The replacement and coverage rates and the duration of beneﬁ  ts of the unemployed vary greatly 
in the 4 countries under consideration. Greece and Spain have among the lowest coverage rates in 
the EU-15, 36% and 47% respectively, whilst in Denmark it is close to 90% of the total workforce. 
60 Greece is also the country with extremely low replacement rates, 50% of the minimum wage (i.e. 
€ 430,75 per month, increased to €454,25 as of May 2009), and short duration of beneﬁ  ts (up to 
a maximum of 12 months), whereas in Denmark, the duration of the Unemployment Beneﬁ  t can 
reach 4 years and the replacement rate is 80%, in the Netherlands the replacement rate is 70% and 
the duration can vary from 6 months to 5 years, whilst in Spain the replacement rate is also 70% of 
the minimum wage and the duration ranges between 1-3 years. 
As mentioned earlier (section 5.2.) in countries with more generous unemployment insurance 
systems, eligibility criteria are becoming stricter and the duration of the beneﬁ  ts’ period shorter (like 
in Denmark and the Netherlands). By contrast, in countries with low replacement rates, the tendency 
is to marginally improve the conditions attached to unemployment compensation. However, the 2002 
labour market reform in Spain has made the receipt of the unemployment beneﬁ  t subject to job 
activation and the non repeated refusal of “suitable” job offers or of a temporary job (Karamessini, 
2008a).
Labour market segmentation
The dividing line in the labour markets has traditionally been between ‘insiders’ (those enjoying 
a stable job and full employment and social security rights) and ‘outsiders’ (the marginalized, precari-
ous workforce, with few if any employment and social security rights). In recent years, however, la-
bour market segmentation has been reinforced along new dividing lines: internal and external labour 
markets, workers with decent wages and the working poor. In Spain and Greece in particular, labour 
market segmentation has been reinforced in 3 ways: (a) through increased labour market ﬂ  exibility 
and the growth of precarious jobs; (b) through the re-invigoration of the underground economy and 
60  ECHP 2002 data, mentioned in Karamessini, 2008a.Page ● 75
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the informal sector as a result of mass immigration inﬂ  ows; and (c) through the increasing violation 
of labour and social security legislation, especially in SMEs (Karamessini, 2008b).
In Greece, labour market segmentation is signiﬁ  cant and pervasive, not so much in the for-
mal labour market but because of the existence of several labour markets. On one hand, there is 
the formal labour market consisting of two sub-systems: (i) the permanent employees working in 
the public sector and in the public utilities, with a high degree of employment protection and a 
very low degree of ﬂ  exibility; and (ii) private sector employees with a varying degree of protec-
tion but greater ﬂ  exibility than the ﬁ  rst groups. On the other hand, there exists an informal or 
“underground” labour market, the extent of which cannot be measured but only estimated, consist-
ing mostly of migrant workers, women and young people that fall outside the scope of any statutory 
regulation and, hence, are highly ﬂ  exible and, of course, insecure. This informal labour market is 
totally deregulated and is characterised by wages not covered by the minimum rates stipulated in the 
collective agreements, unfair dismissals, prolonged working hours, poor health and safety at work 
conditions and a total absence of employment and social security rights. These three labour markets 
operate in parallel and complementarily to each other.
In Spain, according to the EU 2008 Annual Progress Report, labour market segmentation is the 
highest in Europe, mostly owing to the signiﬁ  cant share of temporary work in total employment. 
An agreement with the social partners in mid-2006 has helped to bring down the rate of ﬁ  xed-term 
contracts by 5 percentage points to 29.4% in the second quarter of 2008. Still, the rate of ﬁ  xed-term 
contracts for immigrant workers is extremely high (over 50%) and the unemployment rate for these 
groups has increased more rapidly than for the rest of the population. 
6.3.2.  Institutional initiatives to enhance labour market ﬂ  exibility
In the Netherlands, ﬂ  exible working arrangements, in particular part-time work, ﬂ  exi-time and 
temporary work, have greatly contributed to the successful labour market performance and espe-
cially to high employment levels. As Visser (2005) observes, the 1996 ‘Flexibility and Security’ law 
is a compromise, not just between employers and employees, but also within the unions between 
workers with and those without stable jobs. A relaxation of statutory dismissal protection for regular 
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introduction of a ‘presumption of an employment relation’ in the case of freelance work and ‘sub-
contracting’ self-employment. Temporary contracts, after 3 renewals without interruption, become 
permanent, whilst ﬂ  exible workers gain access to social beneﬁ  ts on the basis of the average hours 
worked.  The overall ﬂ  exibility of the Dutch labour market is also related to the politics of wage 
restraint and low wages for new entrants.
In Denmark, one of the long-standing structural features of the labour market system (dating 
back to the early 1980s) was the combination of high labour mobility and a well developed social 
safety net. This high mobility is made possible by the low level of employment protection (even for 
permanent employees, who constitute the vast majority of the workforce) and the generous unem-
ployment insurance system, coupled by vigorous activation policies. This limited formal employment 
protection applies to the major part of the labour market, irrespective of size of enterprise, sector 
of activity or type of employee (Bredgaard et al., 2005). The successive labour market reforms intro-
duced since the early 1990s have been targeted at re-calibrating the balance between welfare support 
and activation initiatives, with increasing emphasis on the latter (ibid.).
In Spain, an attempt to enhance labour market ﬂ  exibility was ﬁ  rst made in 1994, with the relaxa-
tion of the regulations regarding collective dismissals and the introduction of temporary employment 
agencies. The disappointing results of the 1994 reforms and the dramatic increase of temporary 
work, led to the 1997 Interconfederal Agreement for Employment Stability (AIEE). Unions agreed to reduce 
dismissal costs for certain categories of workers in exchange for a commitment from employers to 
reduce the proportion of temporary contracts (Royo, 2002 in Royo, 2007); a wage guarantee fund 
was established to cover part of the cost of compensation of dismissed workers, whilst reductions in 
severance pay were introduced, along with other incentives, in view of boosting job creation for the 
most vulnerable workers. Reforms in 2001 and 2006 expanded these incentives to other groups and 
granted subsidies for the conversion of ﬁ  xed-term contracts to permanent ones. At the same time, 
these reforms increased disincentives for the use of ﬁ  xed-term contracts by introducing severance 
pay after their expiry, limiting the number of renewals and setting a 24-month limit to the accumu-
lated duration of contracts. Part-time work was also encouraged since 1998–with the consent of Page ● 77
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unions- leading to the abolishment of discriminations against part-time workers and the provision of 
entitlements to employment and social security beneﬁ  ts (Karamessini, 2008b:519-520). 
The labour market legislative framework in Greece has over a long period been one of the most 
restrictive and outdated in Europe. Whilst providing a high degree of protection to those already 
in employment, it left outside the scope of regulation a signiﬁ  cant number of informal or atypical 
working arrangements and considerably restricted access to employment to ﬁ  rst-time job seekers.  It 
also formally allowed ﬁ  rms and organisations little room for functional as well as numerical and wage 
ﬂ  exibility.  
The successive labour market reforms introduced during the period 1990-2005 were an attempt 
to strike a balance between employment growth and competitiveness by increasing labour market 
ﬂ  exibility. It must be stressed, however, that these legislative initiatives were not the result of pres-
sures on behalf of ﬁ  rms, but rather of the external coercion to bring into line the obsolete national 
regulatory framework with developments in the EU. The main labour market legislative initiatives 
included: the annualisation of working time (with workers’ councils’ consent), the encouragement of 
part-time work61, the reduction of indirect labour costs for low paid workers, the rationalisation of 
the collective dismissals’ system, the introduction of ﬁ  xed term work62, telework, interim work and 
alternate work and the establish  ment of private employment agencies and temporary work agencies. 
However, a signiﬁ  cant number of more innovative and employee-friendly ﬂ  exible working patterns 
that are widely used in other EU countries have not yet been introduced in Greece, such as work-
ing time accounts, job rotation, voluntary reduction of working time, partial early retirement, etc. 
The main form of ﬂ  exibility remains overtime work: employers prefer it because it costs less to pay 
overtime, even at a premium rate, than recruit new personnel; employees are keen to work overtime 
because they can top up their low wages. The popularity of overtime amongst workers also explains 
the failure of all the attempts to promote the annualisation of working time: unions are not interested 
61  Part-time work remains unpopular both with employers and employees (organisational problems for the former, 
extremely low remuneration –even below the UB- for the latter).
62  Fixed-term contracts have been widely used in the public sector to provide jobs to favoured groups, especially before 
elections, but also to by-pass restrictive recruitment procedures and criteria. In the private sector, their incidence has 
been declining since 2004, owing to the stricter regulations in their use imposed by the EU directive on ﬁ  xed-term 
contracts (up to 2 renewals and up to 24 months of cumulative duration).Page ● 78
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in consenting to its use as workers prefer to work overtime during peak seasons and get premium 
payments, rather than be compensated by time-off in lieu in slack periods. 
The change of administration in 2004 marked a shift towards more business-driven legislative 
initiatives. Owing to strong reactions from employers, the previous overtime regime 63 which made 
recourse to overtime work easier and less costly for companies was restored, whilst the annualisation 
of working time was made less dependent on unions’ consent.  
6.3.3.   The Industrial Relations system
Unlike the fully developed Industrial Relations system in Denmark and the Netherlands, that 
has allowed the social partners to engage in the design and implementation of labour market and 
welfare reforms (albeit unevenly over time and across actors), in Spain and Greece, adversarial and 
confrontational industrial relations remained a key feature until the late 1980s. Following the fall of 
the dictatorships, the social actors in both countries had to struggle hard to shape their organisational 
identities and develop a stable industrial relations system, within a context not only of a fragile insti-
tutional environment, but also of scarcity of large ﬁ  rms in traditional industry sectors. 64 
It was not until external pressures resulting from increased international competition and the 
process of European integration (European Single Market, European Monetary Union) that a social 
consultation approach developed in Spain, thus making labour market and welfare reforms possible 
(Royo, 2007). A major breakthrough in Spanish industrial relations was when the social partners 
agreed in 2001 on the need to reconcile ﬂ  exibility and security (Valdes Dal-Re, 2004). Unions con-
ceded wage moderation and increased ﬂ  exibility in exchange for employment stability, the creation of 
new jobs, the reduction of the working week and their participation in the elaboration of the welfare 
reform (Royo, 2007). In 2006, in an attempt to rationalise the fragmented collective bargaining system 
that weakened unions’ leverage, the Interconfederal Agreement on Collective Bargaining (AINC) was signed. 
This agreement stipulated that some issues should be reserved for national sectoral bargaining rather 
than regional or company-level bargaining. These issues include: wage structure, occupational classi-
63  In 2000, legislation was introduced aiming at curtailing the excessive recourse to overtime work and boosting job crea-
tion, by making overtime more expensive for companies. By contrast, the previous –and current- regulations stipulate 
that the ﬁ  rst 5-8 hours of overtime work are paid at a normal hourly rate and do not require authorisation from the 
Labour Inspectorate. 
64  For instance, in Greece, 98% of ﬁ  rms employ less than 20 persons and thus –according to the legislation- are union-
free (Kouzis, 2008).Page ● 79
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ﬁ  cations, the regulation of temporary contracts, information rights of work committees and working 
time arrangements (ibid.). 
Although these very same exogenous factors had initially triggered off a process of coordina-
tion and social consultation in Greece also, the results were very short-lived and inconclusive. The 
only instance of a somewhat successful outcome of tripartite social dialogue was the Conﬁ  dence Pact 
concluded in 1997, the only accord of this type ever signed in Greece.65  As soon as Greece joined 
the EMU in 2001, the previous adversarial climate of controversy and intense rivalry between the 
social actors was re-instated. All subsequent attempts at a tripartite social dialogue failed, owing to 
the absence of a ﬁ  rm political commitment on speciﬁ  c issues from all sides. Instead, the central state 
unilaterally imposed labour market and welfare reforms that were doomed to failure. However, the 
regular rounds of bi-partite collective bargaining between the peak level organisations that conclude 
the National General Collective Labour Agreement every year or every 2 years, act as a functional equiva-
lent to social concertation (Ioannou, 2000a). The topics on the collective bargaining agenda include 
mainly wage setting, allowances, leaves (maternity, parental, holiday leaves), and less often training 
issues or working time reduction. More general issues (the so-called institutional ones) are also ad-
dressed. Unlike the other 3 countries however, unions in Greece have persistently refused to include 
ﬂ  exibility issues in the collective bargaining agenda.
6.3.4.   The effectiveness of labour market reforms
The measure of success of labour market reforms is the degree to which they produce the an-
ticipated positive effects on job creation, improved labour productivity and enhanced ﬂ  exibility for 
companies and workers alike. Mainstream legislative labour market initiatives tell only part of the 
story. How these regulations are re-deﬁ  ned at the lower levels of negotiations or implemented at the 
workplace can reveal a great deal of deviation from the original aims, as company practices often 
diverge signiﬁ  cantly from institutional regulations.  
65  This pact is commonly seen as rather ineffective, mainly because such essential policy ﬁ  elds as wage bargaining, taxa-
tion and social security were excluded from its agenda. Moreover, the peak organisation of SMEs refused to sign it. 
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Moreover, the overall level of labour market ﬂ  exibility achieved in a country should be examined 
also from the perspective of whether this ﬂ  exibility at the workplace is geared more towards the em-
ployer than towards the employee, or whether its outcome is balanced. Chung (2007) has classiﬁ  ed 
the EU countries according not only to their degree of ﬂ  exibility (low, medium or high), but also 
according to the additional criterion, whether the ﬂ  exibility arrangements that are practiced actually 
favour one or the other side or both (see Table 7). She concludes from her analysis, that countries 
with a high ﬂ  exibility score for establishments also have high ﬂ  exibility scores for the workforce, and 
vice versa.66  Not surprisingly, Denmark and the Netherlands fall under the ﬁ  rst group whilst Spain 
and Greece fall under the second.  
Table 7: Division of countries, their level of ﬂ  exibility and to whom it is geared towards  
Country Overall Flexibility Geared towards
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands high employees
France, Germany, Ireland, UK, Poland, Czech Rep. medium-high both
Austria, Luxembourg, Latvia, Slovenia , Italy, Hungary medium-low both
Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Portugal low employers
Source: Chung, 2007 
The impact of labour market reforms is also affected by the outcome of collective bargaining at 
the various levels of negotiation. In the Netherlands, the good intentions of the legislator and the fair 
provisions of regulations or agreements are often overturned at the sectoral or ﬁ  rm-level of collec-
tive bargaining. This is more so during periods of economic downturn, when trade unions are in a 
weaker position to negotiate the ﬂ  exicurity agenda. As Houwing (2009) observes, an agreement may 
be considered as fair and balanced at the level of the peak organizations, but at the sectoral level, 
unions often have to consent to deviating provisions in the collective agreements to the detriment 
of workers (especially temporary agency workers, whose security is signiﬁ  cantly reduced), accepting 
more ﬂ  exibility than the one laid down by legislation. 67 So even if the intention of the legislator is to 
strike a balance between ﬂ  exibility and security, the security dimension is often weakened at a lower 
level of negotiation, especially so as the most vulnerable groups in the workforce are those the least 
represented by unions. The market forces seem to acquire a greater inﬂ  uence in policy outcomes 
66  The two liberal economies, the UK and Ireland, are a case apart, with a medium-to-high level of ﬂ  exibility geared 
more towards the establishment (ibid.).
67  Houwing’s  research ﬁ  ndings conﬁ  rm that between  2001-2004, there has been a shift towards more ﬂ  exibility in a 
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when it comes to a lower-level decision making structure, thus strengthening the liberal aspects of 
legislation at the expense of protection (ibid.). 
 Economic rationality and the fear that labour market developments will destroy macroeconomic 
balance have always been the primary foundation of the Danish labour market policy. During the 
years of economic crisis, the right to employment and ﬁ  nancial support became central elements in 
labour market policies. Denmark developed one of the most generous and expansive unemployment 
insurance systems in the world (managed by the unions) providing 90% replacement rate after 1 year 
(or 26 weeks in the past 3 years) of service.68 Growing concerns about the impact that the unemploy-
ment insurance schemes would have on the willingness and the ability of the unemployed to re-enter 
the labour market, soon resulted to a shift in policies: after the mid-1980s, passive policies were sup-
plemented by active measures, focussed on continuing education and supplementary training, in an 
attempt to make the workforce more ﬂ  exible (Larsen, 2004). As structural unemployment was rising, 
the prevailing employment and support schemes came under heavy criticism, eventually leading to a 
new policy shift in the 1990s. Rather than curtailing unemployment beneﬁ  ts (such an initiative would 
face strong political opposition), the labour market reform act in 1994 was instead heavily oriented 
towards stricter eligibility criteria, shorter duration periods and individualised activation measures. 
Job rotation schemes were introduced, to provide job opportunities for the unemployed and training 
opportunities for those already at work. 
These initiatives proved very successful and unemployment was halved in 5 years, a development 
that has been labelled as the “Danish miracle” (Larsen, 2004). 69 Since then, the 1994 reforms were 
adjusted several times towards more activation of the unemployed persons and tougher conditions 
for receiving the unemployment beneﬁ  t. In 2003, new labour legislation was introduced giving more 
emphasis on training, especially for the low-skilled and the unskilled. However, the attempt to reduce 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts for the highly paid employees met with ﬁ  erce resistance from the unions 
and was soon abandoned, indicating that there still persist considerable political barriers to more 
comprehensive cuts (Bredgaard et al., 2005). Overall, as several scholars observe, during the past 15
68  The offset of this system was that the unemployed could remain on the insurance system almost indeﬁ  nitely (Larsen, 
2009).
69  Nevertheless, there are still unresolved marginalisation and social exclusion problems on the Danish labour market: 
about ¼ of the active population of working age (mostly immigrants and refugees) are excluded from the labour 
market and become beneﬁ  t recipients (see Bredgaard et al., 2005).Page ● 82
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years, the Danish labour market policy has gradually increased measures of social discipline at the 
expense of social integration, suggesting a systematic shift in labour market policy away from welfare 
to ‘workfare’. 
Labour market reforms in Spain, have so far had limited success in addressing high levels of 
unemployment and extensive labour market segmentation. During the 1980s, reforms of a restric-
tive system of dismissal protection increased ﬂ  exibility at the margins through liberalising ﬁ  xed-term 
contracts and temporary work agencies, although regulations concerning core jobs remained virtu-
ally unchanged (Viebrock  & Clasen, 2009). As a result of these reforms, employment growth was 
restricted to the “outsiders” and transitions from ﬁ  xed-term or part-time to open-ended or full time 
contracts remained difﬁ  cult, thus increasing labour market segmentation (ibid.). Subsequently, in 
2006, Spain reduced to some extent the asymmetry between open-ended and ﬁ  xed-term contracts 
(the only EU country to do so), as a result of the pressure exerted by the large numbers of temporary 
and unemployed workers on the Spanish government to reduce the protection of the open-ended 
contracts (Boeri, 2009). Nonetheless, the share of temporary employment in Spain remains extremely 
high, particularly amongst the younger age group aged 15-24 years, where 2 out of 3 of total youth 
employment are in a temporary job. Moreover, temporary workers, that constitute 34% of the total 
workforce, have few prospects of improvement: only 4.5% have their contract transformed into an 
open-ended one, whilst 82.6% of ﬁ  xed-term contracts are renewed as such (ibid.).
In a context of relatively high dismissal costs and rigid permanent contracts, Spanish employ-
ers have been using temporary contracts as instruments to introduce ﬂ  exibility in the labour force. 
They thus ended up relying heavily on temporary employment in order to adjust to ﬂ  uctuations 
in demand. They are, however, now becoming increasingly aware that this increasing segmentation 
between permanent and temporary workers “hinders workers’ occupational training, their motivation, and in 
sum the competitiveness of  the ﬁ  rm and the quality of  its products” (leader of the employers’ confederation 
CEOE, mentioned in Royo, 2007).
The signiﬁ  cant labour market reforms in Greece during the 1990-2005 period, eventually had lim-
ited success in boosting ﬁ  rms’ competitiveness and improving labour market performance. The new 
overtime regulations introduced in 2000 actually increased rigidities for companies, as job creation 
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only marginally increased total employment levels, but it reduced costs in the retail sector and selected 
services. Similarly, the encouragement of ﬁ  xed term contracts mostly beneﬁ  ted the agricultural and 
tourism sectors. Overall, legislation facilitating and/or encouraging ﬂ  exibility had isolated positive 
effects but a limited overall impact. This may be explained partly by the low share of the workforce 
affected and partly because it was unable to change deeply-rooted attitudes and policies. Thus, the 
predominance of informal activities and violations persists, while the formal part of the market has 
only marginally become more ﬂ  exible (European Commission, 2005). 
The example of Greece suggests that legislation is not in itself a sufﬁ  cient pre-requisite for 
promoting ﬂ  exibility, if the main social actors do not share the same policy objectives, and are not 
involved in all stages of policy design and implementation, but also, if the enforcement of the regu-
lations at the workplace is poor, owing to the ineffectiveness of inspection mechanisms and the lack 
of political will. 
6.4.   The inﬂ  uence of cultural factors in managing change 
and uncertainty
Culture is an umbrella concept that encompasses a wide range of deﬁ  nitions. It is often, mistak-
enly, seen as homogeneous and static and its potential to change and develop overtime is overlooked. 
Cultural factors, in particular, are often under-estimated when addressing policy implementation is-
sues and assessing the impact of reforms. However, individual and collective behaviour cannot be 
explained solely on the grounds of economic and political considerations. 
Resistance to change
Opposition to change, and opposition to reform in particular, is a common situation in most 
European countries, especially in times of growing uncertainty for the future. 
Quite often changes are rejected because individuals prefer the certainty of acquired rights (and 
vested interests, in the case of more powerful segments of the workforce) rather than the uncertainty 
of future gains, even if no change at all entails the risk of loosing everything (a job, an income, a 
pension, etc…). Nowhere is this clearer than in the vehement opposition to the reform of the social 
security and pension systems in a number of European countries, despite the increased awareness 
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tions, which entail a change in their income and their professional status, if reliable and sustainable 
alternatives to the security provided through the employment relationship are not available.  Can in-
come be safeguarded outside the employment relationship through the ailing social welfare systems? 
This question has in recent years become a source of major concern for the European workforce. 
Given that transitions lie at the heart of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda, the answer to this question is of vital 
importance.
Consensus culture vs. adversarial culture
Consensus about economic and social policy goals between the main social actors (employers’ 
and unions’ organisations, political parties, state bureaucracies and interest groups) is a pre-requisite 
in view of adjusting labour market and welfare institutions to change. Otherwise, they will become 
(or remain) dysfunctional and thus undermine economic performance (Bruff, 2008a). Reforms that 
involve hard choices and a redistribution of costs and beneﬁ  ts in particular, like the welfare state 
reform, require “the construction of a political will and long-term commitments built on norms of 
trust and networks of civic engagement, in order to overcome the inevitable oppositions of groups 
who will loose” (Visser & Hemerijk, 1997:182, in Bruff, 2008a:32). However, the conditions that 
make it possible for trust and consensus culture to thrive are very unevenly distributed.
Why is the ideology of social partnership present in some countries whilst not in others? Katzen-
stein has attempted to answer this question in his study of 7 small advanced industrial European 
states in the mid-1980s.70 In a more recent article (Katzenstein, 2003) that reviews his previous work, 
he reiterates the point that the striking differences in the patterns of historical evolution and the strat-
egies in the countries under investigation as compared to those in larger countries can explain why 
the former were more successful in adapting ﬂ  exibly to the requirements of market competition and 
political legitimacy than the latter (Katzenstein, 2003:12-13). In the small countries, the perception 
of vulnerability generated an ideology of social partnership and an ability to learn from past mistakes 
and adapt to external challenges. This made the acceptance of reforms easier (Katzenstein, 2003).
70  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. See Katzenstein, P, 1985, Small states in 
world markets: industrial policy in Europe, Cornell University Press.Page ● 85
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Hemerijk and Schludi 71 take this point further and argue that the successful reforms in a number of 
policy areas in Denmark and the Netherlands during the 1990s beneﬁ  ted from a “shared awareness” 
of policy problems, triggered by the memory of deep crisis and deep failures. Similarly, Katzenstein 
points out that “exogenous shocks activate deeply seated institutional memories and practices in 
small states with an indigenous tradition of corporatist politics” (Katzenstein, 2003:24).
An overview of the successful performance of the European countries studied by Katzenstein 
and other scholars (Auer, Cox, Hemerijk, Mansbridge, Visser et al.) suggests that their success is 
linked to 4 crucial factors: (a) the high level of trust in political institutions, (b) the learning capacity 
of political leaders, (c) the capacity of national institutions to respond to socio-economic challenges 
by adjusting to change, rather than avoiding it or going against the tide, and (d) the capacity of do-
mestic actors to listen and understand the language and preference of the others. 
It is the combination of these factors that made consensus building possible and produced efﬁ  -
cient and equitable policy outcomes in Denmark and the Netherlands, but not in Spain and Greece.
In Spain and Greece these conditions, especially regarding consensus building, did not apply for 
a number of reasons:
unlike Denmark and the Netherlands that had entered world markets early, Spain and Greece  i) 
are late industrializing countries and part of the periphery of Europe;
Denmark and the Netherlands emerged from the devastating experience of the 2 ii)  nd World 
War with an ideology of social partnership and an elaborate set of fully institutionalized 
concertation policies (Katzenstein, 2003). By contrast, Spain and Greece emerged from the 
2nd World War deeply traumatized and divided by a bitter and prolonged civil war; this event 
and the subsequent period of authoritarian regimes in both countries (albeit with a milder 
form in Greece), undermined the prospects of developing an ideology of social partnership, 
until parliamentary democracy was fully restored in the mid-1970s. Since then, the process of 
European integration provided a fertile ground for the development of a consensus culture, 
but-at least in Greece- not to the extent and the degree of robustness encountered in the 
other pair of countries;
71  Hemerijk A. & M. Schludi , 2000, “Sequence of policy failures and effective policy responses”, in Scharpf F.W. & V. 
Smith (eds), Welfare and work in the open economy: vol.1: from vulnerability to competitiveness, Oxford University Press, pp.125-
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external pressures, like the need to comply with the EMU criteria or with the guidelines of the  iii) 
European Employment Strategy, undoubtedly led to signiﬁ  cant changes in the consultation 
process in Spain and Greece, but were not sufﬁ  cient in triggering off a process of imitation 
in view of replicating the successful trajectory of negotiated change of Denmark and the 
Netherlands.
Individualism vs. communalism
An extensive literature that examines the interaction between economic development and culture 
pays particular attention to the question of how the orientation of a society towards individualism or 
collectivism is affected by and in turn determines the course of economic development.
Weber had stressed the importance of Protestantism, and its emphasis on rational thought and 
the pursuit of individual interests over communal ties in “shattering the fetters of kinship group” 
and triggering off economic growth (Weber in Bell, 2001). According to this line of argument, many 
scholars have argued that the extended family and other traditional networks can become an obstacle 
to economic development because, by providing a safety net to its members (informal insurance), it 
deters them from taking risks and accumulating wealth. Similarly, strong family or community ties can 
also interfere with the functioning of the economy, as personal relationships tend to override the al-
legiance to impersonal institutions and to abstract moral concepts, thus encouraging favouritism and 
nepotism (Plateau, Lewis and Tanzi, in Bell, 2001).
By contrast, the literature on social capital and trust emphasizes the economic beneﬁ  ts of collec-
tivism and stresses the importance of social networks and trust in the creation of prosperity, making 
the point that the absence of mutual trust can explain much of the economic backwardness. This 
literature investigates, in particular, how and to what extent social norms can induce people to behave 
in socially beneﬁ  cial ways, i.e. to cooperate, if this does not maximize their material self-interest. One 
such norm is the “reciprocity” norm that encourages “conditional cooperation”: “people like to help 
those who are helping them and to hurt those who are hurting them” (Rabin, in Bell, 2001). Accord-
ing to Putnam, “voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock 
of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement” (Putnam, in 
Bell, 2001). These stocks of social capital tend to be self-reinforcing, producing high levels of coop-
eration, trust, reciprocity and civic engagement and eventually, collective well-being. Conversely, the Page ● 87
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absence of these traits is also self-reinforcing, leading to an equilibrium of low trust and low social 
capital – a “miasma” (ibid.). An example of such a “miasma” is provided by Banﬁ  eld, in his account 
of a community in Southern Italy entangled in an individualistic culture (“amoral familism”) that pre-
vents it from developing collective action to escape from backwardness (mentioned in Bell, 2001).
A third broad approach to the question how economic development and culture interact puts 
forward the argument that economic development can in fact promote collectivism and coopera-
tion. As people become wealthier, they can afford to act more on the behalf of communal good and 
place greater weight on non material values. The same is true at the aggregate level: wealthier nations 
tend to implement more redistributive policies, like progressive taxation and public assistance to the 
poor (Kuznet, in Bell, 2001). Thus, increases in prosperity tend to strengthen the collective values 
of a society. Whether this is the result of self-interest rather than of genuine internalized morality 
is open to question. In any case, even if “it is material interest, not moral sympathy, that underlies 
social cohesion” (Rosenberg in Bell, 2001), Bell makes the point that overtime, the widespread prac-
tice of cooperation may imbue such behaviour with normative content, so that what has started as 
materially motivated cooperation, becomes a moral imperative and generates a degree of genuine 
collectivism(Bell, 2001).
A ﬁ  nal line of argument focuses on how economic development erodes collectivism and pro-
motes individualism. An inﬂ  ux of wealth or rapid economic growth can either direct a society towards 
an equilibrium of high income and widespread cooperation, or, inversely, as many scholars suggest 
(Ball, Hirschman and others), it can undermine economic performance, leading to a miserable equi-
librium and self-destruction. According to Bell, the outcome will depend on the rate of economic 
growth. If growth is very fast, then the material incentives to defect from the norm of cooperation 
become large, before the society has had enough time to accumulate sufﬁ  cient social capital to deter 
opportunistic behaviour. On the other hand, slow growth allows time for the gradual building-up of 
social capital, so that a strong norm of cooperation has come to existence (Bell, 2001). However, 
even long-term stability of an industrial economy carries within it the seeds of self-destruction as it 
allows time for special interest groups to organize and engage in collective action, in order to pursue 
their material self-interest in ways that eventually lead to economic stagnation (Olson, in Bell, 2001). Page ● 88
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Bell concludes from his analysis that what ultimately affects a society’s degree of collectivism or 
individualism and their interaction with economic development will depend on the following condi-
tions:
The degree of development of formal institutions: the weaker they are, the greater the inﬂ  u- a) 
ence of cultural factors on economic development. When effective formal institutions are 
present, the need for social capital and trust to solve ‘social dilemmas’ will be smaller; 72 when 
they are poorly developed, the potential for some aspects of collectivism to place a drag on 
economic development will also be greater, e.g. by encouraging favouritism in the allocation 
of public resources.  However, it is worth noting here another possibility, whereby institu-
tional arrangements are in place but not enforced, thus encouraging anti-social behaviour on 
the part of both individual and collective actors, and undermining trust and consensus.
The initial conditions prevailing in a society, regarding its level of material prosperity and  b) 
the robustness of its institutions. Individualism is more pronounced in countries where the 
economy does not perform so well and where there is low trust in the ability of the state 
authorities to pursue fair and effective economic and social policies.
Which aspects of collectivism prevail: a collectivism that extends beyond personal relation- c) 
ships and facilitates collective action, or a narrow collectivism restricted to a small group of 
people, unwilling to trust and cooperate with the outsiders, considered as hostile?
The strength and scope of collectivism in a society, i.e. the degree to which the members of  d) 
a wider group are willing to relinquish some of their personal interests in favour of collec-
tive interests; and the size and composition of the group in which the feeling of collectivism 
has force. The widening of networks of interaction and exchange presents opportunities for 
social and economic progress.
The establishment of generalized norms that widen the scope of collectivism and transcend  e) 
personal relationships: this may entail the dissolution of traditional ties based on a strong 
sense of narrow collectivism and replacing them by a new generalized collectivism. This, ac-
cording to Bell, is one of the major cultural challenges faced by society. 
72  Letki & Evans make a similar point: in countries where high levels of institutional accountability and predictability 
have been achieved, social trust is high. But in the absence of formal rules and accountability, interpersonal trust 
becomes a substitute for institutional trust (2005:525). Page ● 89
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The above analytical framework is useful in explaining the differences in both the economic per-
formance and the response to the ﬂ  exicurity agenda, in the 4 countries under consideration. Denmark 
and the Netherlands enjoy highly developed formal institutions, a prosperous and well performing 
economy, and a collectivism that extends well beyond the boundaries of a narrow group of people 
and encourages interaction and cooperation for the beneﬁ  t of the wider community. These traits 
are essential in forging a climate of trust and social partnership that make mutual concessions and 
negotiated change possible. By contrast, Greece is situated exactly at the antipode, with dysfunctional 
institutions, (illustrated mainly in the poor enforcement of regulations, the absence of accountability 
and favouritism towards privileged groups); an economy prone by structural weaknesses; a narrow 
sense of collectivism, based on traditional ties of allegiance; and an unwillingness to put the collective 
interest above the individual one. Even when the principal actors are aware of the issues at stake, they 
seem unable (or unwilling) to pursue common action. 73  Overall, Greece typiﬁ  es the society that has 
enjoyed rapid economic growth, without having had time to develop its social capital that would fos-
ter widespread cooperation and direct it towards a high rather than a “miserable equilibrium”. Spain 
stands somewhere in between, having started from a point of departure similar to that of Greece, but 
slowly moving since the mid-1990s towards a more continental Europe system of cooperation and 
social negotiation, in order to address the challenges of globalization and European integration.  
Trust in the institutions
One important aspect for the implementation of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda is the institutional capac-
ity of the state to implement the necessary control and enforcement mechanisms that prevent indi-
viduals from moral hazard (i.e. cheating against a generous social beneﬁ  ts system) and companies/ 
organizations from breaking the law (Viebrock & Clasen, 2009). The tendency to break the law in 
many countries (esp. in the European South), whether with regard to the violation of the labour and 
social security legislation or tax evasion practiced by both individuals and businesses, is often associ-
73   An illustration of this attitude is the lack of common understanding on how to address the present huge public 
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ated with a weak enforcement capacity of the state (despite a formally rigid regulatory framework), 
as well as with a widespread belief that “all are not equal vis-à-vis the law”. 
Trust in the institutions (domestic as well as international) and in the quality of enforcement 
mechanisms constitute an essential aspect of democratic and effective governance. Dysfunctional 
domestic institutions tend to reproduce the vicious circle of mistrust, lack of consensus and inef-
fectiveness. If institutions such as the national government or the legal system are viewed as weak 
and unaccountable, citizens are less likely to trust them, to adhere to their decisions and to respect 
their authority. Moreover, a low level of credibility of the political system and of the enforcement 
mechanisms drastically undermines the willingness of people to accept change and far reaching re-
forms. The success story of Denmark and the Netherlands would not have been possible if their 
labour market and welfare regimes were not embedded in an institutional environment enjoying a 
high degree of social legitimacy and trust. The famous “golden triangle” that accounts for the success 
of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda in Denmark in particular (and its Dutch variant), would not have been able 
to deliver these results if it was embedded in a dysfunctional and low trust institutional environment 
(see Diagram 10). By contrast, the fragile institutional arrangements in Greece (present and past) and 
the absence of a common vision for the future allow little scope for successful labour market and 
welfare reforms (see Diagram 11). 
Diagram 10: The institutional environment
consensus culture / trust
strong institutions   shared awareness of 
(high legitimacy)    the issues at stake
DK+NL
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welfare regimesPage ● 91
Flexibility and security: an asymmetrical relationship?
Diagram 11: The institutional environment
political exchange -adversarial culture
weak institutions   unawareness of 
(unaccountability, anomy)    the issues at stake
The differences amongst the citizens of the 4 countries under consideration in their degree of 
conﬁ  dence in a number of domestic institutions and public policy issues are striking. According to 
recent Eurobarometer ﬁ  ndings (Eurobarometer 70, autumn 2008), the citizens of Denmark and 
the Netherlands are the ones with the greater degree of trust in their institutions (central and local 
government, political parties, Parliament, legal system) and the policies delivered by state authori-
ties in a number of areas (health care, unemployment beneﬁ  ts, pensions, poverty and inequalities, 
functioning of the public administration). By contrast, the Greek public opinion projects a deep and 
widespread dissatisfaction –that is growing overtime- with the general situation that prevails in the 
country, including the quality of public services. Moreover, Greek citizens believe that their country 
is the taillight of the European Union, as they rate the situation in a series of domains to be worse 
than in other European Union member States. Whilst they express increasing distrust in the national 
government, parliament, the political parties, the local authorities and the legal system, European 
Union institutions get a conﬁ  dence vote. Spain occupies an intermediate position in the continuum, 
usually close to the EU average.
GR
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In particular, Greek citizens in their majority express their strong dissatisfaction for the pensions 
(GR: 91% - EU-27: 58%), the way inequalities and poverty are addressed in Greece (GR: 89% - EU-
27: 67%), the unemployment beneﬁ  ts (GR: 89% - EU-27: 51%), the way public administration runs 
in Greece (GR: 89% - EU-27: 55%), and the health care provision in the country (GR: 78% - EU-27: 
43%). Moreover:
77%   ●  of Greeks seem not to trust their national governments, as opposed to 32% of 
Dutch citizens, 38% of Danes and 49% of Spaniards (EU-27:61%). The current Greek 
negative rate (i.e. distrust) is the 3rd highest of the entire survey sample;
7 out of 10   ●  Greek citizens state not to trust their national Parliament, as compared to 
only 25% of Danes and 40% of Spaniards (ΕU-27: 58%);
    ● a high rate of distrust is recorded by the Greek respondents who take a negative stand-
point vis-à-vis political parties, 86%, as compared to 46% in Denmark and 64% in Spain 
(EU-27: 75%). The Greek negative rate is the 4th highest of the entire survey following the 
ones of Latvia (91%), Portugal (89%,) Croatia (86%) and Bulgaria (86%);
 a majority of Greek citizens expresses feelings of distrust toward the   ●  regional or local 
public authorities (GR: 66%, DK:30%, EU-27: 44%) as well as the legal system of the 
country (GR: 56%, DK:20%,  EU-27: 47%).
By contrast, the EU bodies enjoy the conﬁ  dence of almost 6 out of 10 Greek citizens, substan-
tially above the EU average (GR: 58%, EU-27:47%). Trust is further expressed toward the European 
bodies, i.e. European Parliament (GR: 59%, EU-27: 51%), European Commission (GR: 56%, EU-27: 
47%), Council of the European Union (GR: 56%, EU-27: 42%), and the European Central Bank 
(GR: 51%, EU-27: 48%).
 
Expectations from the future
A growing pessimistic attitude towards the future of the national and global economy and the 
problems of inﬂ  ation and unemployment is now shared by the majority of the European citizens, 
although concern is more pronounced in countries with a weaker economic performance. The pro-
portion of the population that considers that the situation is good has fallen dramatically during the 
past few months, regarding both the European and the national economy. Over half of Europeans Page ● 93
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now expect the employment and economic situation in their countries to worsen over the next 12 
months (Eurobarometer 70, autumn 2008). 74
Inﬂ  ation and the economy are now viewed by European citizens as the two most important is-
sues facing their country. The proportion mentioning the economy as the most important concern 
has increased by 17 percentage points since spring 2008. The proportion mentioning inﬂ  ation in-
creased between autumn 2007 and spring 2008 (+11 points) and retained this level in autumn 2008. 
This new order –replacing crime and immigration as main concerns – further highlights the impact 
of the current economic crisis on the state of public opinion (Eurobarometer 70, autumn 2008). 
Long-term expectations are also very important in determining individuals’ attitudes towards 
change and reform. Two recent Eurobarometer surveys (mentioned also in section 3.2.) bring into 
surface the signiﬁ  cant differences in the expectations of the respondents in the 4 different countries 
regarding the social reality in 20 years’ time and the prospects of ﬁ  nding a job in the event of being 
laid-off. Respondents from Greece are by far the most pessimistic and have a gloomy outlook on a 
majority of items, whilst respondents from Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark have a brighter view 
of the future social reality (see Table 8). Roughly twice as many respondents in Greece feel that their 
life will be worse in 20 years’ time, than in the other 3 countries, whilst a signiﬁ  cantly larger number 
than in the other countries, think that people will not be able to afford the medical treatment they 
might need, and that family ties will be weaker. Conﬁ  dence in the institutions (education, meritocracy, 
equal opportunities) is substantially weaker in Greece than in Denmark, the Netherlands and even 
Spain. The same pessimistic attitude of Greek respondents can be seen regarding their future earn-
ings and working conditions, as well as their prospects of ﬁ  nding a job (see Tables  9 &10).
This is not to say that pessimism or optimism towards the future is associated with the mentality 
or the idiosyncrasy of a nation’s population, but rather with its perception of the reality and of the 
institutional environment: Greeks are not by nature less optimistic than Danes, for example, they 
are simply more aware of the dysfunctions of the domestic institutions and of the potential of their 
leadership to effectively address the challenges and overcome the crisis.
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 Table 8: Share of respondents agreeing and strongly agreeing with the statements (%)
Expectations Greece Spain Netherl. Denmark
peoples’ lives will be worst than today 
in 20 years’ time
67 37 38 32
extension of working lives expected 91 56 87 73
no guarantee of ﬁ  nding a good job 
for people with high educational 
qualiﬁ  cations
87 62 55 59
there will be more equal opportunities 
for women and men
66 82 81 80
people will earn less than today 
because of competition from the 
BRIC countries *
77 57 46 41
working conditions will be better 35 57 57 63
young peoples’ chances in life will 
depend more on merit than family and 
social background
66 67 80 82
access to education and training will 
be easier for everyone
50 76 60 71
the gap between the rich and the poor 
in my country will be wider
87 64 71 70
many people in my country will not be 
able to afford the medical treatment 
they need
84 50 54 46
family ties will be weaker 78 63 52 49
the quality of life will be better 35 63 44 53
there will be new ways to participate 
in decision making, involving people 
more
42 50 61 60
* Brazil, Russia, India and China
Source: European Commission, “Expectations of  European citizens regarding the social reality in 20 years’ time.
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Table 9: Conﬁ   dence about ﬁ   nding a job in the next 6 months, in the event of being laid-off 
  (10= very likely, 1 not at all likely)
EU-25 average Greece Spain Netherlands Denmark
6.1 5.6 6.3 6.9 8.1
Source: Special EUROBAROMETER 261, ‘European Employment and Social Policy”, 2006
Table 10: Conﬁ  dence in having a job in 2 year’s time (%)
Greece Spain Netherlands Denmark
37 43 62 61
Source: Flash Eurobarometer no. 227, 2008 & Special Eurobarometer 26, 2006
Low expectations go hand-in-hand with a defensive attitude towards labour market and social 
reforms that could put into jeopardy vested interests and trigger off new social risks. The concept 
of “ﬂ  exicurity” in particular seems to remain still blurred in some national contexts: for example, al-
though a large majority of respondents in Greece agree that life time jobs with the same employer are 
a thing of a past, only 1 in 2 are ready to accept that job mobility is a useful asset nowadays in view of 
ﬁ  nding a job, compared to more than 9 out of 10 in Denmark (Special Eurobarometer 261, 2006). 
 
Dissatisfaction with the economic situation  
Dissatisfaction with the overall and the personal economic situation also undermines the willing-
ness of individuals to take risks in their professional career and accept drastic changes. Here again, we 
notice striking differences in the attitudes of citizens from the 4 different countries. 75 Nine out of ten 
respondents in Greece and 8 out of 10 in Spain express dissatisfaction about the economic situation 
in their country, as opposed to only 28% in Denmark and 32% in the Netherlands (EU-27: 69%). 
Dissatisfaction rates record a signiﬁ  cant increase when compared to the Eurobarometer survey car-
ried out in autumn 2007 (GR:+14, SP:+34, DK:+26, NL:+22, EU-27:+20). The same deep concern 
applies to the employment situation, as 9 out of 10 Greek and Spanish respondents ﬁ  nd it to be in a 
bad state, as opposed to less than 1 in 10 in Denmark and the Netherlands (GR: 92%, SP:89%, NL: 
9%, DK:8%, EU-27: 69%). The Greek negative rate is the 3rd highest in the entire survey, behind 
Portugal (95%) and Hungary (93%). Dissatisfaction with the personal job situation and the ﬁ  nancial 
situation of the household is also much more widespread in Spain and Greece than in Denmark and 
the Netherlands (“my personal job situation is bad or rather bad”: GR: 40%, SP: 39%, DK: 11%, NL: 
75  See EUROBAROMETER 70, Autumn 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm Page ● 96
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8%, EU-27: 27% and “the ﬁ  nancial situation of the household is bad or rather bad”: GR:54%, SP: 
41%, DK:13%, NL: 7%, EU-27: 34%).
This consistently pessimistic attitude of Greek citizens, as compared to the Danish and the 
Dutch, regarding the economic situation and the future outlook is also conﬁ  rmed by national surveys. 
A recent such survey carried out in Greece reveals the concerns and the fears about the future of the 
majority of the people interviewed: 76
80.7% say things have worsened over the past year   ●
64.4% fear that they might become poor   ●
58.9% are afraid of economic hardship,    ● but, on the other hand:
only 24.6% are willing to accept personal sacriﬁ  ces to overcome the economic crisis   ●
only 28.3% would be willing to work more for the same pay   ●
only 16.5% are willing to pay more taxes   ●
and a mere 9.6% would forego part of their income in return for reduced working hours.   ●
This reluctance to show solidarity towards those worst off is less a reﬂ  ection of a highly indi-
vidualistic attitude, than an increased awareness by the respondents of their deteriorating personal 
situation that they do not wish to see get even worst. The prospect of relinquishing their fragile 
equilibrium is not an option for them.
Although pessimism about the present and the future of the economic situation cuts across the 
vast majority of the population, the problems are more pronounced for certain segments of the 
workforce in Greece, in particular the young people. What, in fact, they can expect after spending 
16-20 years in education is:
prolonged (and non compensated) unemployment, as there are very few entry points;   ●
precarious jobs, underpaid and with few if any employment and social security rights;   ●
a monthly wage of about € 700 per month, which by no means constitutes a living wage    ●
in Greece;
curtailed social security and pension rights for the new cohorts;   ●
unfair inter-generational income and social welfare distribution;   ●
a deterioration of their living conditions, compared to their parents’ generation.   ●
This is a dire situation that calls for more “security” rather than for more “ﬂ  exibility”.
76  Kappa Research, published in the newspaper TO VIMA, 1-1-2009. Page ● 97
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7.  Performance of the 4 countries 
with regard to the main goals of 
ﬂ  exicurity
Looking back to the professed aims of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda (see Diagram 5, section 4.1.) 77, we 
can observe how differently the 4 countries perform, with regard to 3 fundamental policy concerns 
of this agenda: employability, vulnerability and economic efﬁ  ciency.
7.1.   Employability
Using speciﬁ  c dimensions to measure employability, such as training, educational attainment, 
employment protection, and activation measures, signiﬁ  cant differences across the 4 countries are 
brought into light (see Eurofound, 2008e): 
the higher the rate of participation in lifelong learning programmes, the higher the level    ●
of average employability. In Spain and Greece, both indicators are low, whilst in Den-
mark, both are high, with the Netherlands slightly lagging behind Denmark; 
the correlation between the average level of education and the average employability is    ●
very high in Denmark and the Netherlands, whilst it is low in Spain and Greece;
employment protection does not enhance employability: Denmark, with an average to    ●
low job protection enjoys high employability, contrary to Spain and Greece that have a 
high level of job protection but low employability, whilst the Netherlands seem to have 
the best of both worlds as the labour force enjoys a relatively high job protection with 
above average employability;
unemployment beneﬁ  t is positively linked to job security: workers in countries with gen-   ●
erous unemployment beneﬁ  ts also feel less insecure and, consequently, more inclined to 
attempt transitions, as is the case in Denmark.
77  Aims of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda: to ﬁ  ght against labour market segmentation; to keep the skills of workers (especially 
the more vulnerable ones) up to date; to help reintegrate people into employment; to help people cope with rapid 
change; to support safe transitions; to provide people with income security and support (disability, long-term care); 
to enhance work / life balance; and to contribute to sound and ﬁ  nancially sustainable budgetary policies (European 
Commission, 2007b).Page ● 98
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Sustainable employment seems to be exceedingly difﬁ  cult for particular segments of the work-
force in Greece and Spain, like the young people. First time job seekers encounter great difﬁ  culties, as 
a result of labour market rigidities but also of a mismatch between the supply and demand of skills 
and qualiﬁ  cations. This difﬁ  cult transition from education to work entails a delayed emancipation of 
the youths from the family and their protracted co-residence with the parents. On the other hand, 
the high expectations of educated young people for upward social mobility and their aspiration for 
spending and leading a comfortable life deters them from accepting any job offer, especially a pre-
carious and low paid job which is often the only available option. This divergence between social and 
economic expectations and labour market reality potentially contains the seeds of social unrest.
7.2.     Vulnerability
The degree of labour market integration, and hence of vulnerability of those with low quality, 
insecure jobs or no job at all, differs strongly between employment systems. Paugam & Zhou (2007) 
distinguish between 4 types of employment integration:
high quality secure integration, with opportunities for self-development and stability; a) 
high quality insecure integration; b) 
low quality secure integration; and c) 
low quality insecure integration, characterized by cumulative disadvantages and labour market  d) 
marginalization.
As pointed out in section 3.3, inclusive welfare regimes are much better placed to reduce the 
degree of vulnerability of the weakest segments of the workforce. Not surprisingly, Denmark is the 
country in which employment integration is the strongest, with almost 60% of the workforce (as 
compared to only 38% in the EU-15) enjoying high quality and secure employment integration. It 
does particularly well in ensuring that potentially more vulnerable categories of employees are pro-
tected from poor quality and insecure work. A comparison between Denmark and Spain shows that 
a signiﬁ  cantly lower share of atypical workers, low skilled workers and workers employed in low-level 
(routine) services tend to be concentrated in low quality and insecure jobs in Denmark, than in Spain. 
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gration (48.3%) and the lowest low quality insecure integration (13.9%), whilst the Southern regime 
displays an inverse picture: the lowest percentage of the former and the highest percentage of the 
latter. Hence, Paugam & Zhou conclude that there are almost twice as many chances for a worker 
living in a Southern European country to be caught in an insecure and low quality job than there is 
for a worker in a Nordic country, despite the fact that in Southern Europe 1 in 3 jobs are low quality 
but secure. 78
How many people are considered to be vulnerable in the 4 countries under consideration, and to 
what extent? A report by the European Foundation (Eurofound, 2008e) offers us a useful insight in 
this respect: (see Box)
Spain a small share of people, but with higher than average vulnerability
Greece a moderate share of people, with a modest vulnerability
Denmark a higher share of people, but with the lowest degree of vulnerability
Netherlands a slightly above average share of people, with an average vulnerability
There seems to be a trade-off between the number of vulnerable people (and their proportion to 
the total population) and the extent of their vulnerability, that takes different forms in each of the 4 
countries, depending on the welfare regime in place. Overall, workers are less vulnerable in countries 
with a higher “decommodifying” and more generous welfare system, as in the Nordic countries (Eu-
rofound, 2008e). However, even in countries where social protection is inadequate (as is the case of 
Southern Europe), the family and other informal networks can alleviate –as providers of welfare- the 
negative effects associated with vulnerability. 
7.3.   Economic efﬁ  ciency
Last but not least, a measure of success of the implementation of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda is the 
policy outcome in 3 important areas of economic efﬁ  ciency:
the overall economic performance of the country, especially regarding its public ﬁ  nances and  a) 
budgetary policies (see section 6.1.);
the ability of companies and organizations to survive and prosper in a highly competitive (and  b) 
volatile) international context; and
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the adaptability of the workforce to rapid technological change, reﬂ  ected in the matching of  c) 
supply and demand and in the capacity of an economy to make the best use of its human 
capital, especially in relation to skills’ requirements.
In all of the above areas, the performance of both Spain and Greece (especially the latter) leaves 
much to be desired:
employment growth has been restricted to the marginal workforce and/or the informal    ●
sector of the economy;
participation in further training and lifelong learning programmes remain very low, thus    ●
depriving the economy of the necessary skills and qualiﬁ  cations;
traditional forms of work organization continue to prevail in the vast majority of ﬁ  rms;   ●
the competitive advantage of ﬁ  rms is still based on low-cost, low technological capacity    ●
activities and weak institutional regulation. For how much longer? Page ● 101
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8. Challenges  ahead
8.1.   Addressing growing inequalities and labour market 
segmentation through institutional and social reforms
Social protection systems need be drastically re-designed so as to take into account the impact 
of more ﬂ  exibility on individuals and the welfare system, rather than punishing ﬂ  exible workers, as is 
the case today in most countries. This implies broadening the concept of what constitutes “standard 
forms of employment” to encompass the variety of ﬂ  exible working patterns and of employment 
contracts practiced nowadays. The revised systems should also aim to encourage individuals to take 
risks (positive mobility) by moving towards more individualized social security rights and greater 
protection from new risks.
The revised systems should be based on 4 broad principles (Eurofound, 2007):
on the equality of treatment between the various forms of employment contracts; a) 
on the transitions between activity and inactivity, as well as between different employment  b) 
statuses and contracts; 
on the transferability (and, whenever possible, the maintenance) of acquired rights, on the  c) 
occasion of job changes, protected labour market exits or unemployment; 
and on the aggregation of  insurance periods, especially in building pension rights.  d) 
Increasingly, the occupational schemes will have to complement the state-funded social security 
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8.2.   Social dialogue and the representativity crisis: 
who represents the precarious workforce and the 
“outsiders”?
Can there be win-win solutions in the context of labour market reforms? This implies that not 
only large companies and the “insiders” beneﬁ  t from the deal but all the stakeholders as well: the 
“outsiders”, small ﬁ  rms and society at large. 
Gathering support in favour of far reaching reforms presupposes a broad coalition of heteroge-
neous forces that will result from a process of social consultation. As the European Commission has 
put it (2007b, p.18), “the active involvement of  social partners is key to ensure that ﬂ exicurity delivers beneﬁ  ts for 
all (…). Integrated ﬂ exicurity policies are often found in countries where the dialogue –and above all the trust- between 
social partners, and between social partners and public authorities, has played an important role”. 
Perhaps the most fundamental challenge in the social dialogue process is to persuade the rep-
resentatives of divergent and often conﬂ  icting interests to sit around the same table and contem-
plate the prospect of mutual concessions. Workers’ representatives have to be convinced that labour 
market reforms, and especially enhancing ﬂ  exibility can be mutually beneﬁ  cial and will not put into 
jeopardy basic employment and welfare rights, including decent pay and working conditions, whilst 
employers’ representatives must be reassured that their concessions will be cost-effective and sustain-
able, and will not harm their competitiveness in the long run. Social partners’ organizations need also 
to overcome their internal divisions and contradictions. Unions, in particular, need to address the se-
curity needs of the ﬂ  exible workforce too, perhaps at the expense of the “insiders”. Otherwise, they 
risk seeing their membership shrink even further and their inﬂ  uence diminish. 
The precise content of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda and the best ways of implementing it is a good 
starting point for the social partners to engage in a meaningful dialogue, the scope of which will ulti-
mately depend on their genuine willingness to seek present day solutions to urgent problems. If there 
is no such thing as a common agenda, whether it is called “ﬂ  exicurity” or “labour market reform”, or 
“Lisbon strategy”, or just “response to the crisis” (as seems to be the case in the Southern European 
countries), one needs to be devised before it is too late to inﬂ  uence the course of events.Page ● 103
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8.3.   Economic viability of the ﬂ  exicurity arrangements and 
distribution of costs: who pays the bill? 
One of the most difﬁ  cult dilemmas facing policy makers, social actors and individuals alike, re-
garding the implementation of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda, is related to the question: who shall bear the 
substantial costs involved, especially in providing employment and income security? Is it only the 
governments, or do the other social actors also have to contribute? How is the burden to be shared? 
Budgetary constraints, including (in some countries) the Stability Pact, and the ongoing economic 
recession make it increasingly difﬁ  cult to ﬁ  nance active labour market policies and compensatory 
social protection that are required in order to provide safe transitions to the workforce and enhance 
the security dimension of the ﬂ  exicurity nexus. The ﬁ  nancing of the welfare system, in particular, 
will be coming under increased pressure owing to demographic ageing. For their part, businesses 
are also reluctant –even unable- to assume their share of costs, in a period of shrinking proﬁ  ts and 
falling demand. The quest of a new “business ethic” does not seem a realistic expectation under the 
prevailing circumstances.
The question of who pays the cost of the ﬂ  exicurity strategies, especially of the security dimen-
sion, inevitably brings into surface the issue of public ﬁ  nances and of taxation. The example of 
Denmark, points out that it is possible to develop effective employment policies without a reduc-
tion in social expenditure. But is this experience transferable elsewhere, especially in countries with 
under-ﬁ  nanced welfare systems, without recourse to increased taxation? European citizens seem to 
be torn between two irreconcilable situations: (a) whilst everyone seems to be aware of the fact that 
the ﬁ  nancing of more efﬁ  cient social protection systems may require higher taxation, yet (b) there 
is reluctance to assume the cost of the extra burden involved. So, despite deep concern regarding 
growing social inequalities amongst the majority of European citizens, and a wide consensus on the 
need for society as a whole to assume more responsibility for the elderly and the sick, only 40% agree 
to pay higher taxes to support people in need (European Commission, 2008, Flash Eurobarometer). Page ● 104
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Does this mean that a breakaway from the universal and tax-ﬁ  nanced welfare model is unavoidable, 
as many scholars suggest?
Perhaps the answer lies in a drastic reallocation of government spending from other policy areas, 
as well as a more efﬁ  cient use of available resources, including the several EU funds. 79 The participa-
tion of the private sector in ﬁ  nancing some of the measures required (e.g. investing in the training 
of their personnel and providing family friendly policies to working parents) should also be seriously 
considered. Finally, adopting a long term perspective rather than a short-termist approach would help 
both governments and companies assess the future beneﬁ  ts to be reaped from today’s spending, in 
terms of greater economic efﬁ  ciency and social cohesion.
79  For example, the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund, the European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund, etc. Page ● 105
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9. Concluding  remarks
9.1.   Main ﬁ  ndings of the report
The ﬂ  exicurity agenda attracts a number of criticisms and some of its aspects are highly ques- 1) 
tioned, not so much as regards its guiding principles – the need to strike a balance between the 
ﬂ  exibility needs of business and organisations, and the security needs of the workforce is not 
seriously disputed- but rather for its controversial policy content and implementation. Three 
are the main points of criticism:
it is a trade-off between unequal partners (business and labour); a) 
it does not specify who pays the bill for improving the security of the workforce; b) 
its success heavily relies on the soaring numbers of the precarious workforce with few (if  c) 
any) employment and social security rights.
Despite its shortcomings, the ﬂ  exicurity agenda remains the only articulate policy agenda in  2) 
the EU, without a credible alternative. It also constitutes a deﬁ  nite improvement compared 
to the labour market deregulation approach popular in many OECD countries. However, it is 
more suitable for countries with good economic performance and strong institutions than for 
countries with major structural weaknesses, segmented labour markets and residual welfare 
states.
The success of the ﬂ  exicurity policy agenda boils down to 2 fundamental requirements:  3)  re-
sources and trust. Resources to ﬁ  nance the costly active and passive labour market policies, and 
trust to build up consensus and enable mutual concessions between the social partners. If a 
country lacks either or both of these ingredients, it does not qualify for a successful policy 
outcome.
There is no single recipe or path to follow to increase economic competitiveness and enhance  4) 
social cohesion: countries with a very different welfare regime (like, for example, Denmark 
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Overcoming opposition to the ﬂ  exicurity agenda is possible only through social dialogue and  5) 
participation of all the stakeholders in the decision-making process. Otherwise, ﬂ  exicurity will 
continue to incite the same opposition as pure ﬂ  exibility, despite its notable security dimen-
sion and success record in some countries.
Building broad coalitions is of paramount importance in view of pushing through difﬁ  cult  6) 
reforms that put into jeopardy vested interests and with an uncertain outcome. In a context 
of adversarial relationships and of low mutual trust, it is hard to expect the social partners to 
reach an agreement on labour market and welfare reform, 
Additionally, the cross-country analysis of Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Greece, illustrates 
that:
countries with a long tradition in social consultation and negotiated change, like Denmark  i) 
and the Netherlands, are better placed to successfully address challenges and pursue reforms. 
However, even in these countries, the balance of power between business and labour at any 
given time can lead to an asymmetric exchange of concessions;
the presence of a “culture of compromise” is the result of historic factors and is more likely  ii) 
to be encountered in countries where the social actors share a common awareness of  vulner-
ability and of the real issues at stake (i.e. Denmark and the Netherlands);
although the process of European integration has given a signiﬁ  cant impetus to the social  iii) 
consultation process in both Spain and Greece, there is still a long way to go, especially for 
the latter. Exogenous pressures alone are not enough to trigger off a substantial shift in the 
attitudes of social actors towards concertation and cooperation;
the scope and the effectiveness of social consultation also depend on the quality of the inter- iv) 
locutors engaged in the concertation process: how forward looking they are, to what degree 
they can grasp the real challenges and opportunities, and whether they can transcend narrow 
interests and mistrust to develop a new partnership approach;
the increasing heterogeneity of the workforce raises the question as to how suitable are tra- v) 
ditional unions, by deﬁ  nition representing the interests of the more established and pro-
tected workers who form their constituency, to negotiate the ﬂ  exicurity agenda and ensure 
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(non-standard workers). Is it their responsibility to fairly distribute the risks and costs asso-
ciated with greater ﬂ  exibility across the various segments of the workforce? In the case of 
segmented labour markets, this dissonance of interests is even more striking;
the prevalence of an individualistic culture, or of a narrow collectivism, prevents the develop- vi) 
ment of collective action and cooperation for the beneﬁ  t of the wider community;
institutional adaptability and the capacity of social actors to learn from previous mistakes has  vii) 
allowed Demark and the Netherlands to adjust successfully to contemporary challenges;
dysfunctional domestic institutions –in particular a low legitimacy of institutional rules and a  viii) 
poor enforcement of regulations- reproduce the vicious circle of mistrust, lack of consensus 
and individualism. Overcoming this fundamental dysfunction requires agreement between 
the social actors on both the causes of the problem and the remedies to apply; 
the positive labour market performance in Denmark and the Netherlands has been mostly  ix) 
attributed to their successful implementation of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda: low employment 
protection and intense activation policies in Denmark, high incidence of ﬂ  exible but fairly 
protected employment in the Netherlands, a social partnership approach in both countries. 
However, other factors have also contributed to their success, such as: wage restraint in the 
Netherlands, effective enforcement mechanisms in Denmark, a supportive welfare state, the 
demographic composition of the workforce and an increased awareness of their vulnerability 
in both countries, to mention just a few. These factors are path-dependent and non-trans-
ferable as such to any other national context. They can be useful, however, from a learning 
perspective;
by contrast, a highly segmented labour market and a residual welfare regime, compounded  x) 
by substantial structural economic weaknesses, have undermined the chances of successful 
economic and social reforms and of a strong and lasting economic performance in Spain, 
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9.2.   Is the ﬂ  exicurity agenda still relevant in the present-
day economic downturn? 
There is no doubt that with soaring unemployment levels, an aggravation of poverty and inequal-
ities and growing insecurity, the future does not look bright. This gloomy outlook is compounded by 
the on-going twin ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis and the inability of even drastic policy measures to 
contain it. It does, however, also provide an opportunity to reconsider some “conventional wisdoms” that 
have haunted economic policies for too long and to pursue more radical and far-reaching reforms. 
These “conventional wisdoms” that have traditionally been preached by mainstream economic thinking 
are now increasingly coming under question. To mention just a few: 
that self-regulated markets can produce wealth and prosperity for all (“markets are always    ●
right”, according to the dogma)
that greater labour market ﬂ  exibility and less Employment Protection Legislation will    ●
make the European economies and ﬁ  rms more competitive and create more jobs (what 
about the quality of jobs and of employment relations?) 80
that deregulation of the labour market, the welfare and the industrial relations systems    ●
are necessary to address the challenges of globalization and increased competitiveness
that over-regulation and too much welfare undermine the efﬁ  ciency of the economy,    ●
especially of the productive sectors (see the Nordic countries)
that labour is a regrettable cost (that must be minimized to the limits) and not an asset    ●
(on which to invest), whilst managers and CEOs can receive manifold pay and bonuses 
than the average employee81
that businesses should not bear any of the costs associated with the security dimension    ●
of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda.
In the light of the rapidly deteriorating global economic environment the question inevitably 
arises: how relevant is the ﬂ  exicurity agenda as a political strategy in the present-day economic down-
turn? One is tempted to observe that this ambitious agenda, conceived in a period of growth, stability 
80  It is the economies of countries with the most deregulated and ﬂ  exible labour markets, like the USA, Britain and 
Ireland, that seem to be the hardest hit by the global ﬁ  nancial crisis and the economic downturn.
81  In some companies, the ratio between lowest and highest earnings could be as high as 1:365!Page ● 109
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and prosperity and with the more developed European countries in mind, appears like wishful think-
ing when “Rome is burning”, if not the cause of all evil. Can it still deliver its promises regarding 
enhanced competitiveness, job creation, and social cohesion, at a time when ﬁ  rms are closing down 
and laying off workers at an unprecedented scale, and the foundations of the European Social Model 
are shaking? Could it be perhaps already outdated as we are caught amidst a transition period with an 
uncertain outcome that might even force upon the developed world a paradigm shift?
A new policy agenda is undoubtedly needed for the EU countries to remain competitive and for 
the European Social Model to survive the multiple pressures (demographic ageing, growing inequali-
ties and economic stagnation), especially more so as in the (not so) long run, the cost of maintain-
ing the welfare state is expected to outrun the wealth produced. Given the signiﬁ  cant cross-country 
divergences, this agenda must be tailored to the needs of each country. In this sense, the ﬂ  exicurity 
agenda and the European Employment Strategy can serve as a benchmark for the countries lagging 
behind, but not as a straightjacket, condemning them to the status of a “pariah” of the European 
integration process. 
9.3.   Pre-requisites for a successful policy agenda
Even in the context of an increasingly ﬂ  exible and global economy, there are margins of autono-
my by which social reform may lead to greater solidarity in terms of employment integration. If the 
ﬂ  exicurity policy agenda –or any other alternative policy strategy- is to have any chances of success, 
a number of pre-conditions must be met:
A shared awareness of the real issues at stake and a potential for synthesis of the different  1) 
perceptions of reality, through a genuine deliberation involving all interested parties. The 
process of social consultation, however, involves overcoming a number of critical hurdles:
the deﬁ  nition of employment and welfare rights on one hand, and of economic efﬁ  ciency  a) 
on the other;
the low or disputed representativeness of the employers’ and workers’ organizations; b) 
the establishment of implementation and monitoring mechanisms;  c) 
the lack of conﬁ  dence in adhering to the terms of the eventual agreement; d) Page ● 110
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the fair sharing of costs between the different stakeholders. e) 
In essence, it presupposes:
a common understanding on the urgent need to pursue and manage change in the areas    ●
of labour market, productivity and social cohesion, in a context of unprecedented eco-
nomic constraints;
a clear agenda with a strong commitment from all sides: the state, employers, union;    ●
the involvement of all interested parties, especially those with a weaker bargaining power;   ●
a commitment at all levels of negotiation and implementation to pursue feasible security    ●
for all, rather than strict employment protection or the total shift of employment protec-
tion towards social protection” (Auer, 2008).
2)  Mutual and balanced concessions between business and labour, in view of arriving eventu-
ally at a “new deal” between the social partners for more radical reforms that will be able to 
address the huge challenges ahead. The element of “fairness” should be present in every bi-
lateral or tripartite agreement signed, in every piece of labour legislation introduced. This will 
not be possible, unless the most salient asymmetries in the labour market systems are restored, 
such as:
the asymmetry between the rights and entitlements associated with open-ended contracts    ●
and those associated with ﬁ  xed-term contracts;
the asymmetry in the balance of power between employers’ organizations and trade un-   ●
ions, but also within unions, the asymmetry in the fair representation of all segments of 
the workforce;
the asymmetry in the quality of sacriﬁ  ces requested by the workforce, as opposed to those    ●
requested by businesses;
the asymmetry between the skills required by ﬁ  rms/organizations and those supplied by    ●
the workforce, and the education and training systems. 
3)  A long-term perspective and the capacity to seek new solutions to new challenges
4)  An ability of the central authorities to convince of the necessity and appropriateness of a 
policy programme.
5)  A change of attitudes and mentality.Page ● 111
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9.4.   The fate of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda in times of 
uncertainty
In the light of the present-day global economic downturn it is hard to predict whether the ﬂ  exi-
curity policy agenda will either perish, to be replaced by the next fashionable and politically useful 
concept, or outlive its critics, to become an enduring component of a particularly European approach 
of combining employment and social policies (Vierbrock & Clasen, 2009). In any event and regard-
less of the outcome of this particular approach, European policy makers and national authorities and 
social actors need to address some daunting challenges.
The ﬁ  rst challenge stems from the concern regarding the fate of the victims of labour market 
deregulation. The reduction in job security and the growth of precarious work jeopardise the chances 
of the “outsiders” (whose share in the total workforce is on the rise) to fully participate in the labour 
market, with a “proper” job and full rights and entitlements. Increasing labour market segmentation 
and growing inequalities inevitably pose the question: should those better off relinquish part of their 
security and income to improve the situation of the more vulnerable, especially of the precarious 
workforce and the working poor?
The second challenge is associated with the growing awareness that the “precarisation” of large 
segments of the workforce, and the rise of in-work poverty, further undermine the sustainability 
of the European Social Model. In the (not so) long-run, the cost of maintaining the welfare state 
is expected to outrun the wealth produced. How will the ESM survive? Can the Nordic model of 
reconciling economic efﬁ  ciency with a satisfactory level of employment integration for the great 
majority of workers be transferred to other socio-economic contexts? The answer eventually lies in 
the perception of the welfare state also as a productive factor that can not only provide a safety net 
for people to take risks, attempt transitions, and learn new skills, but also improve the functioning 
of the labour market by reducing segmentation and wage dispersion and improving the matching of 
supply and demand. 
The third challenge is about not losing sight of the real issues at stake (issues that are often dis-
guised in the debate): providing decent work, ﬁ  ghting against precariousness and in-work poverty, 
enhancing social cohesion, whilst at the same time boosting productivity and improving economic 
performance. This will require building up consensus in view of arriving at a “new deal” between the Page ● 112
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social partners for more radical reforms that will be able to address the huge challenges ahead. How-
ever, as power relations between the main players always determine the outcome of the negotiations, 
the strength of business vis-à-vis organised labour will undermine the fairness and sustainability of 
this new deal, unless the state assumes its role as an arbiter and ensures a positive interaction between 
the different players with no winners and losers. 
Last, but not least, those EU countries that are lagging behind need to come to terms with 
the bare truth that struggling to remain competitive in the world economy as low-cost production 
countries is not an option anymore. Lowering labour costs will not make business more viable or 
more competitive, as the gap in wages and in employment conditions of the other low cost countries 
outside the EU is huge and widening. What could increase the competitiveness of these economies 
would be increased investment in the knowledge society, in innovation and in human capital. 
As a ﬁ  nal point, and coming back to the initial questions raised in the introduction of this work, 
we can sum up are conclusions in a nut shell:
The ﬂ  exicurity policy agenda is best suited to countries with good economic performance, ro- a) 
bust institutions and a consensus culture. In this sense, it deﬁ  nitely constitutes a step forward 
from aggressive (and one-sided) neo-liberal and deregulation policies.
Its relevance for countries with structural weaknesses, weak institutions and a poor social  b) 
partnership approach is highly questionable. Alternative and more appropriate strategies –tai-
lored to the particular national idiosyncrasies- need to be designed and pursued.
Even in countries with a success record, there are winners and losers in the process of im- c) 
plementation of the ﬂ  exicurity agenda. Uneven trade-offs reinforce the divides within the 
workforce, lead to new inequalities and threaten social cohesion, as well as the viability of the 
European Social Model.Page ● 113
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Annexes
Diagram I: Flexicurity indicators 
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share of adult population in education and 
training (2007) * 29.2% 16.6% 10.4% 2.1%
educational attainment of the 
45-54 years age cohort (2005) 6 78% 69% 41% 51%
educational attainment of the 
25-34 years age cohort (2005) 87% 81% 64% 74%
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unemployment rate (total, 2007)*  3.8% 3.2% 8.3% 8.3%
youth unemployment (less than 25 y.), 2007* 7.9% 5.9% 18.2% 22.9%
long-term unemployment rate (over 12 
months) as a % of total unemployment  9 18.2% 41.7% 27.6% 50.3%
growth in labour productivity (2000-2007) 10 0.8% 1.2% 0.0% 3.1%
labour productivity per hour worked (2007)11 1.9% 1.7% 0.6% 1.7%
net replacement rates after 5 years of 
unemployment (2001) 12
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average annual wages (2006, average USD, 
per FTE) 14 56 598 45 337 27 735 25 934
Figure I



















































































Source: J.I. Antòn Pérez’s analysis from 2007 Observatory of  European Small and Medium Enterprises 
Survey. 
(Footnotes)
1  The question of the distinctiveness of a Southern European model of social protection and wel-
fare state has caused much debate, with some scholars arguing that the 4 countries, Italy, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, constitute a ‘fourth world of welfare capitalism’, whilst others insisting that 
they are simply a subcategory of the corporatist, continental welfare regime (see Karamessini, 
2008a). However, the centrality of the family and the immaturity and residual character of the 
social protection systems differentiate substantially the Southern European welfare regimes from 
the continental European ones.
2  Notes: OECD 2003, overall index, version 1
3 Eurostat  deﬁ  nition: (a) persons with seasonal employment; (b) persons engaged by an agency or 
employment exchange and hired to a third party to perform a speciﬁ  c task (unless there is a writ-
ten work contract of unlimited duration); (c) persons with speciﬁ  c training contracts. 
4  Based on self deﬁ  nition as a part-time worker (spontaneous answer)
5  Based on a common deﬁ  nition of part-time work. See OECD Employment Outlook, 2007
6  OECD, Education at a glance, 2007. Same for row below this.
7 EUROSTAT,  2004
8  OECD Employment Outlook 2006, Statistical Annex
9  OECD Employment Outlook, 2007
10  The Conference Board and Groningen Growth & Development Centre, Total Economy Data-
base, January 2008 
11  Employment in Europe, 2007-forecast
12 OECD,  Tax-Beneﬁ  t Models. www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives 
13  EUROSTAT, 2006 (after social transfers)
14  OECD Employment Outlook, 2008 
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